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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
One of the first lessons for a marketing student is the 4 Ps concept of price,  product, 
promotion and place, which defines the basic environment and goals of marketing (Jobber, 
2006). Within this illustrative framework, “price is the only marketing strategy variable 
that directly generates income. All the other variables in the marketing mix generate costs: 
advertising and promotion, product development, selling efforts, distribution, packaging – 
all  involve expenditures”  (Monroe,  2002, p.  8).  As a consequence,  the definition of a 
product's price is a crucial determinant for the entire success of an enterprise. Research 
revealed that the price in fact has a sustainable impact on  profit in practice  (Garda & 
Marn, 1993; Marn, Roegner, & Zawada, 2004). 
Despite the importance of pricing for a company's profitability, it is rarely based on esti-
mates  of  buyer  behavior  (Monroe  &  Cox,  2001).  Even  so,  the  prediction  of  buying 
behavior in the form of willingness-to-pay estimates is essential for optimal pricing deci-
sions  (Balderjahn, 2003). The aim of this study is to provide practitioners with a usable 
forecasting technique of willingness-to-pay. Such forecasts are understood as a prerequi-
site  for  effective pricing strategies  as  they allow to “plan for  the  future and to  make 
rational decisions” (Armstrong, 2001, p. 3). The challenge regarding these forecasts  lies 
in meeting the conflicting demands of accurately and practically measuring willingness-
to-pay. 
The preceding literature has already developed reliable measurement methods for willing-
ness-to-pay.  Derivations  of  auctions  or  lotteries  provide  relatively  accurate  results  of 
consumer's  willingness-to-pay  (e.g.,  Skiera  & Revenstorff,  1999;  e.g.,  Wertenbroch  & 
Skiera,  2002) though  their  practical  usage  has  been  largely  disregarded  though.  For 
accurate measurements, the product under investigation need to be sold to the respon-
dents, resulting in greater complexity and costs. Alternative methods not dependent on 
selling to the respondent exist, but suffer from validity concerns. Especially the contingent 
valuation which directly asks the respondents to state their willingness-to-pay for a given 
product represents a cheap and flexible measurement approach. However, respondents are 
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known to generally give higher willingness-to-pay values in the hypothetical contingent 
valuation than result in a real buying situation (cf. Harrison & Rutström, 2002) and thus 
bias the results.
An assessment of consumers' uncertainty in their answer represents an approach to correct 
this measurement error. First successes have already been published (e.g., Blumenschein, 
Blomquist, Johannesson, Horn, & Freeman, 2008). On the basis of these results, this study 
further  analyzes  consumers'  purchasing  behavior  and  identifies  product  knowledge, 
product involvement and preference uncertainty as important indicators for consumers' 
uncertainty in  the  purchase  situation.  More  specifically,  consumers  with  high  product 
knowledge, high involvement and well-established preference patterns are supposed to be 
able to determine their willingness-to-pay judgments with higher certainty. This relation-
ship is tested for its applicability to calibrate the measurement of willingness-to-pay. The 
result would be an enhancement of the contingent valuation's accuracy.
The results do not clearly indicate the interaction effects between the consumers' uncer-
tainty  and  the  accuracy  of  directly  measured  willingness-to-pay.  Thus,  the  elaborated 
hypotheses are dismissed and the methodological contribution of the forecasting technique 
was not successful. Nevertheless the results strongly prove the precarious overestimation 
of consumers' willingness-to-pay in the hypothetical situation. The raw contingent valua-
tion measurement should clearly not be used for uncritical derivation of pricing decisions. 
Since the proposed consumer characteristics could not fully explain the overstatements, 
different cognitive processes are supposed to exist between real and hypothetical willing-
ness-to-pay  elicitation.  The  clear  message  of  this  study  is  the  importance  of  further 
research and deeper investigation of the process how willingness-to-pay is determined. 
The study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter examines the importance of 
pricing, highlights the relevance of forecasting and justifies the research objective. The 
aim of this chapter is to orient the study toward the specific requirements of forecasts. In 
the  second chapter,  the  problem areas  and biases  of  measuring willingness-to-pay are 
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discussed.  Additionally,  the  existing  measurement  methods  are  evaluated  according  to 
their accuracy and practicability. As a result, the contingent valuation is chosen as to best 
meet  the  criteria  concerning  forecasts.  Its  shortcomings  concerning  validity  and  their 
possible corrections are then elaborated in the third chapter. Indications for the decisive 
role  of  uncertainty  in  willingness-to-pay  formations  are  discussed.  The  theory  of  the 
moderating role of consumer characteristics in the willingness-to-pay elicitation is estab-
lished and concrete hypotheses are formulated. The fourth chapter covers the empirical 
testing of the proposed relationships and features an insightful comparison of the different 
measurement methods. In the final chapter possible reasons for the failure of the estab-
lished theory are discussed while providing directions for further research.
2 Pricing Decisions and their Information Needs
2.1 Companies' Price and Consumers' Value
Kotler and Armstrong (2009, p. 289) define price as “the amount of money charged for a 
product or service, or the sum of the values that consumers exchange for the benefits of 
having or  using the product  or service”.  This  definition first  and foremost  relates the 
monetary amount to the value the consumer is perceiving. The price is not necessarily 
determined by production costs. Fiat for instance sells its Fiat Tipo higher than the Fiat 
Uno because it offers higher comfort, although its production is actually cheaper (Jobber, 
2006). In contrast to cost-based pricing, the price estimation is already conducted before 
the production, since the value determines the decision for attractiveness of a market and 
the features needed (Breidert, 2006). In reality, companies often base their pricing on cost-
oriented  considerations  (cost-based  pricing)  rather  than  what  consumers  are  actually 
willing-to-pay – so-called value-based or demand-based pricing (Shipley & Jobber, 2001). 
Adapting prices from competitors, using intuitive pricing or mark-up pricing are dominant 
decision strategies for managers (Levy, Grewal, Kopalle, & Hess, 2004; Monroe, 2002). 
As a consequence, large profit potentials remain unexploited (Garda & Marn, 1993; Marn 
et al., 2004). 
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For rational pricing decisions, the knowledge of the price response function is of indis-
pensable importance  (Simon & Fassnacht, 2008).  The price response function links the 
quantity sold to the price of the product and provides information how price-sensitive 
consumers  are.  Its  concept  is  similar  to  the  demand function,  but  not  the  same.  The 
demand function specifies how a whole market reacts to changing prices,  whereas the 
price response function deals with the demand for the product of a single seller as a func-
tion  of  the  price  requested  by  this  seller  (Phillips,  2005).  In  simple  terms,  the  price 
response function tells managers how many people will buy the product at differing price 
levels. 
In the discussion of pricing, it must, however, not be forgotten that prices are set in a 
competitive environment. A price change will most likely lead to immediate reactions of 
the  competitors  eliminating  the  gained  price  advantage.  Obviously,  price  is  not  an 
adequate  way to  differentiate  the  own product  from the  competitors'  offers  in  a  free 
market, if the higher price is not founded on a competitive advantage like strong brand or 
cost advantage (Breidert, 2006). Yet, the price together with other factors can be used to 
successfully differentiate the own product or service from the competition. Product Differ-
entiation is in general based on the identification of consumer segments and their specific 
demands  (Dickson & Ginter,  1987).  Early adopters,  people who have high interest  in 
brand-new technologies,  are  a  good example  for  a  consumer  segment  willing  to  pay 
higher prices. In practice, a common error in pricing decisions is “pricing truly innovative 
products far too low.” (Hinterhuber, 2004, p. 768). Once the product is introduced, a price 
increase becomes more difficult  (Simon & Fassnacht, 2008). Therefore it is essential to 
assess the perceived value by the consumers beforehand and identify profitable segments 
(Monroe,  2002).  Nevertheless,  also  saturated  markets  may  provide  opportunities  and 
possibilities for price increases. The trend of mass customization, for instance, emphasizes 
the need for customized pricing (Choudhary, Ghose, Mukhopadhyay, & Rajan, 2005). In 
any case, the price advantage has  to be based on competitive advantages in a market or 
market segment; a simple price increase can not sustain (Marn et al., 2004). 
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For a successful segmentation of the market and the establishment of a price advantage, it 
does not suffice to know the demand of a market, but rather an estimation is needed how 
each  individual  customer  values  the  product  (Armstrong  &  Kotler,  2009;  Völckner, 
2006a). The maximum amount of money an individual is willing to spend for a certain 
product or service is known as willingness-to-pay in the literature  (e.g., Wertenbroch & 
Skiera, 2002). Willingness-to-pay thus represents the sum of benefits a consumer might 
experience from a purchased product  (Ryan & San Miguel,  2000).  Kalish and Nelson 
(1991,  p.  327) similarly  define  willingness-to-pay  as  “a  direct  monetary  measure  of 
product value.” The consumer will consider to buy a product if the price does not exceed 
his/her perceived utility of the product (Simon & Fassnacht, 2008). Demand curves of a 
whole market are in fact the aggregated individual willingness-to-pay values for a product 
or service (Phillips, 2005). Similar to the existing literature, the term reservation price will 
be used interchangeably with willingness-to-pay in this study. 
For clarification, the term willingness-to-pay should not be confused with the terms will-
ingness-to-buy nor willingness-to-accept. Willingness-to-buy refers to the buying decision 
of an individual in the form of a dichotomous choice. One can either choose to buy or not 
to buy a product. For example, researchers might be interested in the willingness to buy 
food  via  the  Internet  (e.g.,  Grunert  &  Ramus,  2005).  In  contrast,  willingness-to-pay 
denotes the maximum price at which one is just willing to buy and is therefore a monetary 
value. Willingness-to-accept represents the minimum amount a seller is willing to receive 
for a certain product or service. Willingness-to-accept takes the perspective of the seller 
who is trying to maximize his/her earnings from the purchase (e.g., Simonson & Drolet, 
2004). 
2.2 Price as a Marketing Tool
The already given definition of price by Armstrong and Kotler (2009) further implies that 
price is not a fixed value, but a variable that is charged by the producer. The setting of 
prices should be regarded as a powerful marketing tool rather than a given fact. Although 
price being one component of the famous 4Ps framework, it is often neglected. In practice 
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managers frequently focus more on market share gains and cost reductions  (Marn et al., 
2004). However, the conflict between high market share and price leadership is not always 
the case. “In a variety of industries, from software to pharmaceuticals, specialty chemicals 
to cars, aircraft to apparel, it is quite common for the premium price brand to also be the 
market  leader.  [...]  High market  share and high prices  can be achieved if  prices  truly 
reflect high customer value” (Hinterhuber, 2004, p. 766). 
An important advantage of the factor price is that contrary to research and development, 
advertising and cost reductions, a change in price does not mean any additional costs and 
has an immediate impact on profit  (Marn et al., 2004). Even small changes can have a 
decisive impact on profit, as price is the most effective profit lever. A simple example of 
Simon and Fassnacht  (2008) illustrates  this  statement  well.  The  price  of  an industrial 
product may be for instance 100 € and the quantity sold may account for 1 million. Addi-
tionally, the fix costs may be 30 million and the variable costs 60 €/piece. In this situation, 
the company would earn 10 million €. For a comparison of the effect on the profit of these 
variables, let each of them improve by 10 percent while keeping all other factors constant. 
The profit from a 10 percent increase of the sales would lead to a profit increase of 40 
percent. A 10 percent decrease of the variable costs would increase the profit about 60 
percent and in the case of fix costs of 30 percent. However, a 10 percent increase of the 
price raises ceteris paribus the profit about 100 percent. The reason is quite obvious: the 
price directly affects the profit, whereas the increase in sales is partly offset by increased 
variable costs. The cost reductions have a lower impact on the company's profit as well. 
Yet, the price's effect on profit also holds in the negative case: a 10 percent decrease of the 
price means a decreasing profit of 100%. 
Evidently, the made assumption of keeping the other factors constant is a simplification 
and does not hold in reality. A price increase will decrease the quantity sold. However, 
small changes of up to 3% in prices frequently do not significantly affect actual sales 
(Simon & Fassnacht, 2008). In a study of Dickson and Sawyer (1990), for instance 50%, 
of the interrogated supermarket shoppers could not correctly name the price of the prod-
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ucts they had placed in their shopping cart. Additionally, the fact that many shoppers did 
not recognize price reductions is astonishing. Furthermore, the importance of the factor 
price is also documented in real world examples. For a sample of Fortune 500 companies 
“a 5% increase in average selling price increases earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
by 22% on average, compared with the increase of 12% and 10% for a corresponding 
increase  in  turnover  and reduction  in  costs  of  goods sold,  respectively”  (Hinterhuber, 
2004, p. 766). Therefore, the price performance of a company should be regarded as a 
precondition to profitability. 
2.3 Forecasting Willingness-to-Pay
Given the profit potential of price, profound research on consumers' demand is essential 
for the effectiveness of a pricing strategy (Jedidi & Zhang, 2002). However, only 8% to 
15% of all companies base their pricing decisions on estimates of buyer behavior (Monroe 
& Cox, 2001). A gap between the economic theory of price and its application seems to 
exist as many price potentials are often not fully exploited  (Simon & Fassnacht, 2008). 
The question arises why the estimation of consumers'  willingness-to-pay is largely not 
considered as an essential factor in a company's pricing. 
One reason for  the  negligence  of  implementing a  price strategy is  surely the  missing 
commitment  to  adapt  and  exploit  theoretical  concepts  of  research  in  some  branches 
(Simon & Fassnacht, 2008). Companies in a free market are usually believed to be “price 
takers”, with only little chance to adjust prices for their own products or services. Price is 
generally perceived to be set by the market and therefore not being manageable (Marn et 
al., 2004). It often seems that companies like the role as price takers, because they do not 
have to  deal  with it  and can concentrate  on cost  reduction and market  share increase 
(Hinterhuber, 2004). Statements like – “This does not work in our branch as our customers 
are highly price sensitive” – often attest limited interest (Simon & Fassnacht, 2008). Addi-
tionally,  it  is  a  common misbelief  among managers  that  a  5% percent  price  decrease 
would  be  offset  by  5% increase  in  sales  (Simon  &  Fassnacht,  2008).  As  the  above 
example showed, the impact of price and volume on profit is different. According to Marn 
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et al.  (2004), only few markets experience a price elasticity, which would allow to prof-
itably trade off price for volume. According to Simon and Fassnacht (2008) the branches 
of  pharma  industries,  premium car  part  producers,  telecommunication  companies  and 
airlines are positive examples where advanced price management systems are applied. 
Besides the low awareness and high skepticism towards the price as a marketing tool, the 
practical difficulty of integrating willingness-to-pay data in the planning process may as 
well  explain  the  low  usage  of  market  research  for  pricing  decisions. As  already 
mentioned, information about willingness-to-pay is, however, necessary for making good 
decisions (Balderjahn, 2003). Regarding the estimation of willingness-to-pay, theory and 
practice  seem to  have  different  demands  of  measurement  methods.  On  the  one  hand 
researchers are quite successfully focusing on improvements in accuracy (e.g., Skiera & 
Revenstorff,  1999;  e.g.,  Wang,  Venkatesh,  &  Chatterjee,  2007;  e.g.,  Wertenbroch  & 
Skiera,  2002), on the other hand practitioners use the more practical  methods like the 
conjoint analysis and the contingent valuation for pricing studies  (Hartmann & Sattler, 
2004). Accurate measurement methods are generally based on auctions and own the crit-
ical disadvantage that the product is actually sold to the respondents adding to cost, time 
and overall complexity. One may argue that the practitioners in general favor cheaper and 
easier methods, which are known to suffer from validity concerns. 
In order to satisfy the practical requirements, this study aims to establish a new measure-
ment  approach  in  order  to  allow  forecasts  of  willingness-to-pay.  “Forecasting  is  the 
prediction of future values of a variable based on known or past values of that variable or 
other related variables”  (Makridakis & Wheelwright,  1978, p.  684). The estimation of 
future sales, market size, market share and competitors' action are common subjects to be 
forecasted (Armstrong & Brodie, 1999). What is missing in practice are forecasts on the 
price dimension. The possibility of predicting consumers' willingness-to-pay enables an 
early identification of trends in consumers' demands and profitability of single segments. 
Forecasting involves reducing uncertainty of the future and is best used when it enables 
the organization to take advantage of future opportunities while avoiding future threats 
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(Makridakis & Wheelwright, 1978). The internal resources can be better allocated and the 
profitability of product differentiation can be better and earlier assessed. Since consumers' 
preferences change (Breidert, 2006), willingness-to-pay estimations are best conducted on 
a regular basis. Especially price sensitive industries would benefit from recurring willing-
ness-to-pay forecasts  of  markets  or  product  categories.  Forecasts  are  accomplished  in 
order to anticipate and recognize problems, threats and opportunities in the marketing plan 
(Cohen, 2005). Furthermore forecasting is also a central prerequisite for new products 
(Armstrong  &  Brodie,  1999).  Willingness-to-pay  forecasts  imply  advantages  for  this 
application field as well. The possibility of including willingness-to-pay in the planning 
process is in general  seen as a critical  element for a successful pricing strategy.  Fore-
casting  of  willingness-to-pay  is  focusing  on  a  greater  flexibility  and  cost-efficiency. 
Against this background, it is worthwhile to identify the specific criteria, which allow to 
evaluate forecasting techniques.
2.4 Methodological Demands of Willingness-to-Pay Forecasts
In general,  accuracy is also the primary performance criterion of a forecasting method 
(Makridakis & Wheelwright, 1978). In psychometrics and psychophysics the term validity 
is  more  commonly used  than  the  term accuracy,  as  in  contrast  to  accuracy no easily 
obtainable truth exists (Hulley, Cummings, Browner, Grady, & Newman, 2006; Mueller & 
Martorell, 1988). Validity denotes the degree of how much an instrument measures what it 
is designed for to measure (Craig & Douglas, 2005). 
In the willingness-to-pay context, indicators for the validity of a measurement are face 
validity,  internal  and  external  validity.  Due  to  their  relevance  for  the  comparison  of 
results, these terms are briefly explained. Face validity is concerned with the plausibility 
of the measured results  (Schreier & Werfer, 2007). This can be  realized with additional 
control  questions  for  concepts,  which  are  supposed  to  be  relevant  for  the  measured 
construct.  Internal validity deals with the “correct” representation of the relating data in 
the  sample  (Völckner,  2006a).  Internal  validity  in  the  context  of  willingness-to-pay 
measurements is in general assessed on the basis of estimated price response functions 
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and their fit to the observed values (Skiera & Revenstorff, 1999; Wertenbroch & Skiera, 
2002).  External validity describes in how far the obtained results are close to the reality 
and therefore, how well a willingness-to-pay measurement holds in real purchase situa-
tions (Hulley et al., 2006). External validity is probably the most important criterion, as it 
provides information about the measurement's error. 
Nevertheless, “forecasting should not  be judged on the simple accuracy criterion but its 
role should be enlarged and be concerned with its ability to improve the decision making 
within  organizations”  (Makridakis,  1981,  pp.  307-308).  Therefore  it  is  reasonable  to 
extend the forecasting performance indicators beyond validity and consider the manage-
rial implications for a company. Timeliness and costs represent important considerations 
for  the  choice  of  a  forecasting  method  (Remus  &  Simkin,  1987).  “Unless  forecasts 
become available to decision makers at the time they are needed, their value is practically 
lost”  (Winklhofer & Diamantopoulos, 2002, p. 163). Companies in volatile markets are 
dependent on flexible and quick forecasts in order to adapt prices to new situations. Addi-
tionally, the gain of accuracy a certain method provides must be contrasted with the asso-
ciated costs. In situations where rough estimates are sufficient cheaper methods may be 
preferred. Even for small firms with lower budgets it may still be advantageous to base 
their  pricing on rough measurements of consumers'  willingness-to-pay than to rely on 
plain “gut feeling”. Finally, Makridakis and Wheelwright (1978) also consider the ease of  
application an  important  criterion  for  the  choice  of  a  forecasting  method.  This  term 
reflects the complexity and the level of knowledge required for application as well as the 
ease with which it can be conveyed to the final user. 
In order to achieve a meaningful trade-off between accuracy and costs in a specific situa-
tion, it is essential to know the differences among the existing approaches. The following 
chapter compares the applicability of existing measurement methods as forecasting tech-
niques according to the discussed criteria. First of all, the problem fields of willingness-to-
pay measurement are presented and consequently the shortcomings of existing methods 
emphasized. 
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3 Measuring Willingness-to-Pay
3.1 Measurement and Biases of Willingness-to-Pay Measurement
For quantitative forecasting, three conditions need to be met: first,  there is information 
about the past; second, this information can be quantified in the form of data; third, it can 
be assumed that the pattern of the past will continue into the future (Makridakis & Wheel-
wright, 1978). The first two conditions relate to a measurement in the present, from which 
the willingness-to-pay in the future is inferred. As a consequence, quantitative forecasting 
of willingness-to-pay requires the usage of a measurement method. The third condition, 
known as the assumption of constancy, is especially critical in the context of willingness-
to-pay and should  be  treated  with  caution.  The  circumstances  of  a  willingness-to-pay 
measurement are rarely equivalent and may affect the given responses (Breidert, Hahsler, 
& Reutterer, 2006). In particular, the situational demand is an important factor in willing-
ness-to-pay formation  (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002; Völckner, 2006a). For instance the 
weather most likely has a large effect on the amount people would pay for a cold drink. 
For this reason the situations, in which the measurements are conducted, should closely 
resemble the future buying situation. Although past consumer behavior is not necessarily 
the same as future behavior, it  constitutes an important informational source for many 
forecasting methods (Makridakis & Wheelwright, 1978). 
Regarding the measurement of willingness-to-pay, the literature has identified two partic-
ular  biases: the strategic and the hypothetical bias (Breidert et al., 2006). Both are known 
to affect the validity of the measurement  (e.g., Blackburn, Harrison, & Rutström, 1994; 
e.g., Posavac, 1998).  The strategic bias refers to the fact that people are not necessarily 
willing  to  reveal  their  honest  reservation  prices  (Völckner,  2006a).  Respondents  may 
misstate their preferences because they think to have an influence on the final pricing 
decision of the product (McFadden, 1998). This bias may lead to overstatements or under-
statements. People will understate their willingness-to-pay because they want to lower the 
prices for market introduction  (Bishop & Heberlein, 1979). Alternatively, they may also 
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overstate their willingness-to-pay due to the intention of seeing the product being intro-
duced in the market (Green, Jacowitz, Kahneman, & McFadden, 1998). Empirical studies 
have  not  yet  found solid  evidence  for  strategic  behavior  in  willingness-to-pay studies 
(Mitchell & Carson, 1990; Völckner, 2006a). Yet, a study of Posavac (1998) for instance 
proves strategic overbidding in a contingent valuation for a public good, namely improve-
ments  in  community  living  areas.  In  this  study,  respondents  who  expected  that  their 
college would be responsible for paying the improvements stated a higher willingness-to-
pay than respondents who thought to be personally responsible for paying the bills.
The  hypothetical  bias  occurs  if  willingness-to-pay statements  are  not  backed up  with 
actual  purchases  (e.g.,  Ben-Akiva  et  al.,  1994;  e.g.,  Harrison & Rutström, 2002;  e.g., 
Hoffman, Menkhaus, Chakravarti, & Whipple, 1993).  This implies that the measurement 
is based on intentions rather than behavior  (Dodge & Hanna, 1997). In contrast to the 
strategic bias, the hypothetical bias in general has a direction, namely to overestimate the 
elicited willingness-to-pay, which has been empirically proven in a number of studies (cf. 
Johannesson et al., 1999). For instance, in a study by Cummings, Harrison and Rutström 
(1995) the participants were asked in a first step, if they would buy a product for a given 
price. When they were really offered the product for this price afterwards, only one out of 
ten respondents really followed their positive buying intention given beforehand. Strictly 
speaking,  the  hypothetical  bias  can,  however,  only be  verified  if  the  same method is 
applied under the real and the hypothetical setting, in order to eliminate a method bias 
(Frykblom,  2000;  Völckner,  2006a).  A study fulfilling  this  requirement  was  done  by 
Völckner  (2006b) and Lusk and Schroeder  (2004), in which measurements in real and 
hypothetical settings of several methods were compared. The hypothetical results signifi-
cantly exceeded those of  actual  transactions.  Empirical  evidence for  the  measurement 
errors resulting from the strategic and hypothetical bias is presented in section 4.1.
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As already mentioned, willingness-to-pay is an unobservable construct and each measure-
ment method can only try to approach a person's true willingness-to-pay as closely as 
possible (e.g., Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). The collective efforts of economics, psychol-
ogists and market researchers established several different methods in research, but no one 
has yet fully convinced in terms of accuracy, practicability and cost efficiency (Breidert et 
al., 2006; Völckner, 2006a). The existing measurement methods are illustrated (Figure 1) 
following the classification of  Breidert et al. (2006). On the highest level willingness to 
pay  measurements  can  be  grouped  in  measurements  based  on  stated  preference  (cf. 
Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000) or revealed preference  (cf. Ben-Akiva et al., 1994). 
Revealed preferences are simulated or actual price response data, whereas stated prefer-
ences are hypothetical survey-based methods. 
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Figure 1: Classification of Measurement Methods (Breidert et al. 2006)
3.2 Classification of Measurement Methods
Revealed preference can be further distinguished in real world market data and experi-
ments. Experiments can take the form of laboratory experiments and field experiments. 
Market data denote store scanner data or customer panels. Laboratory experiments are 
basically simulated purchase situations  (Silk & Urban, 1978) whereas field experiments 
take place under real-world shopping conditions. The application of auctions are treated 
here as a separate category due to their importance for willingness-to-pay measurement. 
Stated preferences rely on survey techniques, which either directly ask for willingness-to-
pay or indirectly infer reservation prices from preference rankings or ratings. The respon-
dents of direct surveys are either consumers themselves or experts, who are supposed to 
have a high knowledge about customers' behavior  (Breidert et al., 2006). Each method 
shows advantages as well as disadvantages relative to the others (cf. Breidert et al., 2006). 
However,  an  important  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  theoretical  propositions  can  be 
made. Market data, laboratory experiments, field experiments and expert judgments are in 
general based on aggregated demand data (Völckner, 2006a). Although panel surveys and 
experiments can be principally used for individual willingness-to-pay measurement,  in 
practice however these methods are evaluated in aggregated form, due to limitations of the 
individual analysis (Ben-Akiva et al., 1994; Bucklin & Gupta, 1999; Völckner, 2006a) or 
due to substantial outlays (Nagle & Holden, 1994). The disadvantage of aggregated data is 
the impossibility of identifying the more profitable segments, as discussed in section 2.1. 
For the identification of customer segments along the price dimension, it is indispensable 
for  researchers  to  be able  to  interpret  willingness-to-pay on the individual  level  (e.g., 
Balderjahn, 2003; e.g., Völckner, 2006a). Individual levels are especially important if the 
price-sensitivity is assumed to be heterogeneous (Breidert et al., 2006). 
As a result, this study will not consider market data, experiments and expert judgments 
any further and focus on surveys and auctions. Surveys and auctions offer a measurement 
of willingness-to-pay on the individual level and in general exhibit a cheaper and less 
complex way of willingness-to-pay measurements (Völckner, 2006a). 
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The willingness-to-pay is best predicted by measurements of actual buying behavior, since 
the hypothetical bias is hereby eliminated. One of the best measurement methods fulfilling 
this criterion is probably the lottery after Becker, DeGroot and Marshak (1964), hereafter 
BDM lottery  (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002; Wang et al., 2007). This auction form was 
originally designed for the measurement of individual risk awareness, but since the late 
1990s it has been increasingly used in the context of willingness-to-pay elicitation (e.g., 
Bohm,  Lindén,  &  Sonnegård,  1997;  e.g.,  Noussair,  Robin,  &  Ruffieux,  2004;  e.g., 
Rutström, 1998; e.g.,  Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). During the BDM lottery,  bids are 
submitted but the actual price for the product is then determined by a drawn lottery ticket. 
These lottery tickets are price tags, which cover an interval of estimated willingness-to-
pay values for the product. In order to prevent anchoring effects, the distribution of the 
prices should be kept secret  (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). Alternatively, an already set 
price, which is not known by the respondents, may reduce the problematic definition of 
the price range for the lottery (Schade & Kunreuther, 2002). After each participant gave 
his/her bid for the product, the binding price is drawn from the lottery. Each bid above the 
drawn price forces the bidder to purchase the good at the price determined by the lottery. 
The participants submitting a lower bid than the drawn ticket are not allowed to purchase 
the good. In other words, the price the participants are paying is determined by chance and 
only those participants, whose bids exceed the lottery price, are required and allowed to 
purchase the product. 
What makes the BDM lottery so important  is  the fact  that  additionally to  eliminating 
hypothetical  bias  this  mechanism ensures  that  every  bidder  has  an  incentive  to  state 
his/her maximum price willing to pay. Methods of that kind are characterized as incentive 
compatible (e.g., Backhaus & Brzoska, 2004; e.g., Skiera & Revenstorff, 1999). Incentive 
compatibility means that people's best decision is to truthfully reveal a private information 
during  an  experiment  (McAfee  &  McMillan,  1987;  Myerson,  1979).  Game  Theory 
provides criteria for the formal proof of incentive compatibility. Besides the less rigorous 
Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the concept of the dominant-strategy equilibrium can be applied 
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to examine incentive compatibility. A dominant strategy is defined as “the player's strictly 
best response to any strategies the other players might pick, in the sense that whatever 
strategies they pick, his payoff is highest” (Rasmusen, 2001, p. 16). To put it differently, 
there  exists  a  solution  for  the  player  to  maximize  his/her  utility  irrespectively of  the 
actions of other players. In incentive compatible willingness-to-pay methods, the bidding 
is so designed that truth-telling is the dominant strategy for each bidder. This can be real-
ized  by  canceling  the  influence  of  a  respondent's  action  on  the  price  of  the  product 
(Völckner, 2006a). In terms of willingness-to-pay measurement an incentive compatible 
method should theoretically lead to respondents' true willingness-to-pay values, because 
for each bidder the best strategy, the dominant strategy, is to state his/her true willingness-
to-pay (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). In sum, the BDM lottery eliminates the hypothet-
ical bias due to the real transactions involved and its incentive compatibility moreover 
penalizes strategic behavior in the bidding process. Despite this sophisticated approach 
and the high validity of the BDM measurement method, its application as a measurement 
method for forecasting is difficult due to practical limitations. 
The benefit of backing up measurements with real transactions may well eliminate hypo-
thetical bias, but also adds to costs, timeliness and flexibility. In the BDM lottery products 
need to be sold to each respondent. Hence, the costs of the BDM lottery depend on the 
price drawn by the lottery and the amount of people who refuse their purchasing obliga-
tion (Völckner, 2006a). The necessity of real transactions also limits the applicability of 
the BDM lottery for expensive or specialized goods (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). If the 
subject of a willingness-to-pay experiment was a car, people are likely to have strong 
concerns buying their new car from a research project.  Finding potential car buyers to 
participate  is  probably a  difficult  and  time-consuming  task.  Extra  costs  for  providing 
confidence and trust like the partnership with a car dealer or the supervision of a notary 
are  needed  in  order  to  convince  people  to  buy  their  new  car  in  a  research  project 
(Völckner, 2006a). Furthermore product alternatives are missing, which may reduce the 
general willingness-to-pay for higher priced goods  (Völckner, 2006a). It surely is not a 
coincidence that in most of the research studies, which feature BDM auctions, fast moving 
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consumer goods like beverages or sweets are sold (e.g., Rutström, 1998; e.g., Wang et al., 
2007; e.g., Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). Another practical limitation of the BDM lottery, 
which is  also related to  the actual  selling of goods,  is  the application for innovations 
(Völckner, 2006a). In most cases the new products, which are to be introduced, are only 
available in a conceptual stage. However, for the BDM lottery the product needs to be 
fully developed. Especially innovations require early estimations of the willingness-to-pay 
of the target market due to high risk of introducing new products (Armstrong & Brodie, 
1999). The result may then influence the further physical development of the new product. 
Companies may for instance decide to abandon certain features in order to be able to set 
lower prices. 
3.4 Stated Preferences: Surveys
Customer surveys ask the consumer directly for his/her willingness-to-pay of a specific 
product or service. This method is commonly used for public or non-marketed goods (e.g., 
Gregory, Lichtenstein, & Slovic, 1993). In this context, it is better known as contingent 
valuation method  (e.g.,  Mitchell & Carson, 1990). An alternative notation is the direct 
price  elicitation  method  (Backhaus,  Wilken,  Voeth,  &  Sichtmann,  2005).  Stoetzel 
(1954) was among the first to use this approach and asked the consumer about his/her 
personal minimum and maximum price threshold, in which he would buy the product. The 
lower  threshold  aims  at  the  price level  consumers  are  not  willing  to  undercut  due to 
quality skepticism. Many refinements of the direct survey have been used in research in 
the last decades. In general two approaches can be identified  (Völckner, 2006a). In the 
open-ended approach, the respondents are directly asked to state their willingness-to-pay 
(e.g., Kalish & Nelson, 1991). In the closed-ended, also known as dichotomous choice 
approach,  the  respondents  receive  one  or  several  subsequent  offers  with  one  single 
product but differing prices, which they either can accept or reject (e.g., Cummings et al., 
1995). The direct price elicitation is used by market research companies; A.C. Nielsen's 
BASES Price Advisor tool, for instance, represents a special form of a direct survey, in 
which several product profiles are evaluated by the respondents (Völckner, 2006a). Addi-
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tionally, GfK uses direct price elicitation for an assessment of critical price ranges (Brei-
dert et al., 2006). The Price Sensitivity Measurement of Research International is based as 
well on the contingent valuation approach (Völckner, 2006a). 
The direct survey as a method for willingness-to-pay elicitation evidently suffers from 
several  limitations concerning its validity,  which have already been partly brought up. 
First, the setting is hypothetical. Second, the direct questioning on the price overempha-
sizes the importance of the price cue relative to other product attributes  (Simon, 1992). 
Third,  the  respondent  has  no incentive  to  reveal  his/her  true  willingness-to-pay.  As a 
consequence, the possibility of  strategic behavior may bias the stated willingness-to-pay 
(Dodge & Hanna, 1997; Nagle & Holden, 1994). 
Rather than asking consumers about their willingness-to-pay directly and thus possibly 
overemphasizing the importance of price, researchers were looking for a more realistic 
and  unobtrusive  solution.  The  most  prominent  form  of  such  indirect  surveys  is  the 
conjoint analysis, which measures consumers' preference structures rather than willing-
ness-to-pay values (Backhaus & Brzoska, 2004; Green & Srinivasan, 1990). The respon-
dents receive whole product profiles, which contain systematically varied attributes and 
prices. The respondents rank, rate or select these product offers according to their personal 
preference.  In principle,  the conjoint analysis  tries to derive the utility contribution of 
single attributes from empirical preference judgments, e.g., the price (Backhaus, Erichson, 
Plinke, & Weiber, 2006). Pricing studies have become a major field of application for the 
conjoint analysis (Wittink & Cattin, 1989; Wittink, Vriens, & Burhenne, 1994). Since the 
introduction of “the classic conjoint analysis” in the marketing research field  (Green & 
Rao,  1971),  different  variations  have  evolved  (e.g.,  Johnson,  1987;  e.g.,  Louviere  & 
Woodworth, 1983). 
In direct comparison, the conjoint analysis should theoretically outperform the contingent 
valuation method in terms of validity  (Völckner, 2006a). Still, there are also theoretical 
disadvantages, in particular for including the price of the product as an additional product 
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attribute. If the price is part of the offer, the price range of the presented offers is crucial 
for the willingness-to-pay elicitation. Usually the price range is set to cover the most usual 
market prices. A respondent's willingness-to-pay which substantially exceeds or goes well 
below the  market  price  level,  cannot  be  adequately measured  (Breidert  et  al.,  2006). 
Furthermore, the price range cannot be simply extended. The range of an attribute affects 
the respondent's perceived importance of that attribute. To put it differently, increasing the 
range  increases  the  perceived  importance  as  well  (Verlegh,  Schifferstein,  &  Wittink, 
2002). This phenomenon is known as range effect in psychophysics (e.g., Parducci, 1974). 
Similarly,  the  number  of  levels  of  a  certain  attribute  has  an impact  on  the  attribute's 
perceived importance (Steenkamp & Wittink, 1994). The so-called number-of-levels effect 
is higher than the range-effect (Verlegh et al., 2002). This means that researchers can not 
raise accuracy in implementing more price points, without artificially increasing the focus 
on price. In this regard, a third potential source for biased results needs to be stressed, 
which is known as the price effect (Breidert et al., 2006). If the total number of attributes 
is increased the importance of the single attribute, e.g., the price, decreases (Williams & 
Kilroy, 2000). In general, the validity of the conjoint analysis is dependent on a critical 
examination of these effects and a well thought-out study design for each survey. “The 
price effect, the range effect and the number-of-levels effect cannot be avoided for price, 
when it is included as an attribute in a conjoint study”  (Breidert et al., 2006, p. 25). In 
essence, these theoretical concerns put the theoretical superiority of the conjoint analysis 
in perspective.
3.5 Discussion of Measurement Methods
Due to the discussed practical limitations of revealed preferences in the context of willing-
ness-to-pay measurement, this study prefers measurement methods, which are not depen-
dent on real transactions, but rely on stated preferences. The survey-based measurement 
seems more appropriate for the demands of costly and flexible willingness-to-pay fore-
casts. “Of particular importance is the flexibility of hypothetical methods”  (Mitchell & 
Carson, 1990, p. 87). Hypothetical measurements, although being less accurate, can be 
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conducted faster, more flexible and cheaper than revealed preference methods. Although 
the accuracy of the BDM lottery still must be denoted as superior, hypothetical methods 
enable marketers to conduct several different measurements at low costs. 
Nevertheless, the BDM lottery has been used quite successfully for willingness-to-pay 
elicitation (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). It offers a maximum of validity and approaches 
the true willingness-to-pay the closest (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). Wang et al.  (2007, 
p. 203) even “believe that the BDM approach is the ʻbestʼ method.” The BDM lottery is 
understood  as  representing  the  state-of-the-art  accuracy  level  of  willingness-to-pay 
measurement and an excellent benchmark for the validity of hypothetical measurement 
methods. Hence, this study will use the BDM mechanism in order to provide the willing-
ness-to-pay behavior aimed to be predicted. 
Concerning  the  comparison  of  the  conjoint  analysis  and  the  contingent  valuation,  the 
empirical literature could not find clear validity differences. One of the first studies which 
empirically  compares  different  methods  for  willingness-to-pay elicitation  according  to 
validity, was done by Kalish and Nelson  (1991). The study on airline tickets tested for 
external validity by predicting hold out samples on the basis of the conjoint analysis as 
well as the direct price elicitation. After completion of the surveys, the airline tickets were 
sold to the respondents. As a result, the conjoint based approaches outperformed the direct 
price elicitation. 62% of the demand were correctly predicted by both conjoint analyses, 
whereas  the  contingent  valuation  predicted  only  46%  correctly.  The  calculated  price 
response functions were, however, more plausible in the case of the contingent valuation. 
Interestingly, the study of Völckner (2006b), in which prepaid telephone cards were sold, 
could  not  find  any significant  difference  between  the  direct  price  elicitation  and  the 
conjoint analysis. “The changing signs of differences between these two methods indicate 
that  there  is  no clear  evidence on which method results  in  higher  willingness-to-pay” 
(Völckner, 2006b, p. 143). Regarding this study, it is worth noting that the same study had 
already been published by Sattler and Nitschke (2003). The results of the study of Sattler 
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and Nitschke  (2003) were validated by a partial replication study of  (Backhaus, Voeth, 
Sichtmann, & Wilken, 2005). The study design of Sattler and Nitschke (2003) hereby was 
maintained as closely as possible except for a smaller sample size and four city trips as the 
study's  subjects.  Also  only  the  contingent  valuation  and  the  conjoint  analysis  were 
compared.  The  replication  revealed  contradictory  findings  respective  the  high  perfor-
mance of the contingent valuation method. In the replication study, the conjoint analysis 
approximates real purchase more closely in the hypothetical situation. The authors indi-
cated the higher involvement and the higher complexity of the product offerings as an 
explanation for the contradictory results. 
In essence, the superiority of the conjoint analysis over the contingent valuation has not 
yet been empirically proven (Backhaus & Brzoska, 2004; Völckner, 2006a). In contrast, 
the contingent valuation holds advantages with regard to the discussed criteria concerning 
forecasts of willingness-to-pay. Additional to time and cost benefits in data collection and 
analysis, also the high flexibility is a reason for its attractiveness as willingness-to-pay 
measurement method (Diller, 2000). During the conjoint analysis many different product 
portfolios need to be elaborated and presented adding to time, cost and flexibility. The 
study  of  Völckner  (2006b) featured  respondents'  ratings  of  the  generally  perceived 
complexity. Not surprisingly, the direct price elicitation was rated the least complex. 
An advantage of the conjoint analysis worth mentioning is its better applicability to elicit 
willingness-to-pay for innovations, because it is generally easier for respondents to value 
single product components and features  (Völckner, 2006a). Nevertheless, the contingent 
valuation is the most flexible form of hypothetically measuring willingness-to-pay and 
thus represents a suitable forecasting technique. “Within the important constraint that the 
scenario must have plausibility for the respondent, the contingent valuation researcher can 
easily specify a variety of stats of the good to be valued and the conditions of its provi-
sion” (Mitchell & Carson, 1990, p. 87). Hence, a central benefit of the contingent valua-
tion is the possibility to elicit willingness-to-pay in specific contexts. “Willingness-to-pay 
is a situation-specific, individual level construct. It should be regarded as a function of the 
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perceived value of a good in the specific value elicitation situation” (Völckner, 2006b, p. 
148). Thus, marketers are interested in how consumers' willingness-to-pay changes under 
marketing  mix  conditions.  The  realization  of  willingness-to-pay  studies  in  specific 
contexts may not only increase the perceived reality but also provide important insights in 
situational differences. 
In this  regard Wertenbroch and Skiera  (2002) emphasize the possibility to include the 
point of purchase as a major advantage for willingness-to-pay elicitation methods. This 
implies that market research is enabled to carry out transactions “at real points of purchase 
under the marketing-mix conditions the marketer desires” (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002, 
p. 230). A study result of Thaler (1985) illustrates the importance of situational contexts 
for  willingness-to-pay  elicitation.  In  this  study respondents  were  confronted  with  the 
following situation. They should imagine to be lying on a beach and a friend would call 
and ask if he shall bring them a can of their favorite brand of beer, either from a fancy 
resort hotel or a small run-down grocery store. They were supposed to tell this friend the 
maximum amount willing to pay for the beer and he would only buy it if the price was 
below this amount. The two situations were kept constant except for the point of sale. In 
the fancy resort hotel example, the respondents' median for willingness-to-pay was $ 2.65, 
whereas in the grocery store situation the median denoted only $ 1.50. Although the can of 
beer and the place of consumption were the same and respondents did have an incentive in 
answering truthfully their true willingness-to-pay differed for the two points of purchase. 
Given the advantages concerning flexibility, costs and timeliness, the contingent valuation 
is seen as the best suited method for hypothetical willingness-to-pay measurements for the 
purpose of this study. This decision leads to the question which type of questioning should 
be used: open-ended or closed-ended questions. The closed-ended approach better simu-
lates an actual buying decision more closely (Mitchell & Carson, 1990). Similarly, Li and 
Mattsson (1995, p. 267) state that the discrete choice contingent valuation is “more market 
like  and  and  easier  for  the  respondent.”  Despite  of  this  advantage,  the  closed-ended 
approach is supposed to reduce the necessary concentration on the revelation of the true 
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willingness-to-pay and lead to inaccurate results (Mitchell & Carson, 1990). An important 
limitation of the closed-ended approach is the so-called starting-point bias, which means 
that the provided prices affect respondents' willingness-to-pay (Herriges & Shogren, 1996; 
Frykblom & Shogren, 2000). This bias is related to the general anchoring phenomenon, 
which is very robust and empirically well established (cf. Chapman & Johnson, 2002; cf. 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This implies that even if a provided solution is obviously 
unrealistic and false, it affects the respondent's own answer (e.g., Green et al., 1998; e.g., 
Simonson & Drolet, 2004). 
In essence,  the open-ended elicitation format  is  seen as offering a less subjective and 
easier alternative to closed-ended questions and is therefore selected for eliciting indi-
vidual  willingness-to-pay  values  for  the  forecast.  In  the  forecasting  literature,  this 
approach can be classified as intention-based forecast (Armstrong, 2001). One important 
principle concerning forecasting with intentions is stated by Morwitz  (2001, p. 34): “do 
not accept intentions data at face value; rather, adjust intentions to remove biases.” This is 
necessary  because  people  do  not  necessarily  act  in  accordance  with  their  intentions 
(Morwitz,  2001).  The next  chapter  shows why this  statement  holds  and how such an 
adjustment of willingness-to-pay intentions can be achieved. 
4 Calibration of Direct Price Elicitation
4.1 Measurement Errors in the Contingent Valuation
The direct comparison of measurements of the contingent valuation and the BDM displays 
the discrepancy in validity between both methods that needs to be corrected. For instance, 
Schreier and Werfer (2007) empirically compared the validity of the BDM lottery and the 
contingent valuation among other methods. The direct price elicitation significantly over-
stated the willingness-to-pay in comparison to the values of the BDM lottery. The willing-
ness-to-pay for the same iPod in the contingent valuation was almost twice as high as in 
the BDM (CV: M = € 164, SD = 105; BDM: M = € 73, SD = 59). Additionally, the face 
validity of the contingent valuation was found significantly lower as the willingness-to-
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pay correlated less with the interest in the product. The price response functions of the 
tested methods exhibited a high fit (R2 > 0.97) and the elasticities of all methods displayed 
plausible ranges. As a consequence, the direct price elicitation and the BDM lottery were 
considered to offer a satisfactory level of internal validity. 
The studies of Wertenbroch and Skiera  (2002) further shows the superior validity of the 
BDM lottery compared to the direct price elicitation. The mean difference between the 
BDM and the contingent valuation were 20% for a can of Coke (CV: M = DM 1.35, SD = 
.81; BDM: M = DM 1.06, SD = .66) and 33% for a piece of cake (CV: M = DM 1.68, SD 
= .82; BDM: M = DM 1.12, SD = .56). Respondents overstated their willingness-to-pay in 
the direct, hypothetical questioning compared to the incentive compatible BDM lottery. 
The correlations between the liking, the current demand and the willingness-to-pay were 
also higher for the BDM lottery and show a higher  face validity.  Concerning internal 
validity, the BDM lottery featured a better fit to the predicted price response function than 
the contingent valuation. Regarding external validity, only 1 out of 41 respondents and 3 
out of 40 respondents refused to follow the purchase obligation in the Coke and the cake 
study. Nevertheless, the satisfaction with the purchase was relatively high for both studies. 
Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) assign high external validity to the BDM mechanism. 
Additional to the already discussed literature, these empirical studies prove an overestima-
tion by the contingent valuation and demonstrate the need for a correction of this measure-
ment error. The size of the error is definitely too large for meaningful forecasts. In partic-
ular, two concrete benefits of the BDM over the contingent valuation have been identified: 
the reduction of strategic bias and the elimination of the hypothetical bias. These biases 
need to be worked on in order to achieve improvements in the measurement of the contin-
gent valuation. 
Little is known today about the exact consequences and size of strategic behavior in the 
measurement of willingness-to-pay elicitation (Völckner, 2006a). The practical effective-
ness  of  incentive  compatibility in  the  revelation of  truthful  statements  has  been chal-
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lenged. Incentive compatibility does not necessarily mean that strategic bias can be totally 
eliminated.  An  incentive  for  a  truthful  revelation  does  not  necessarily  imply that  the 
respondent will  recognize the optimal strategy or follow this  strategy  (Wertenbroch & 
Skiera,  2002;  Kaas  &  Ruprecht,  2006).  The  term  empirical  or  behavioral  incentive 
compatibility was used for a differentiation between theoretical and practical implications 
(e.g., Kaas & Ruprecht, 2006). Völckner (2006b, p. 143) similarly states that “a rational 
decision-maker might be a rare exception under practical circumstances.” Signs for the 
partly ineffectiveness  of incentive compatibility exist  in  the literature.  In  the study of 
Schreier and Werfer  (2007), 23% of the respondents failed to answer a control question 
for the BDM lottery despite the high effort  in explaining the mechanism.  In contrast, 
Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) noted that their respondents well understood the procedure 
and were satisfied with the outcome. However, no control questions have been posed in 
this particular study. 
Schreier  and Werfer  (2007) moreover  provide evidence for  strategic  bidding  behavior 
within BDM lotteries. Interestingly, some respondents speculated on a particularly favor-
able price or intentionally gave very low bids so that they had no chance of winning. The 
dominant strategy was obviously ignored by some participants. Another critical assess-
ment of incentive compatibility comes from Kaas and Rurecht (2006). In their study, they 
examined the theoretical superiority of incentive compatible methods in practice. One of 
the major findings is that 22% of the respondents in the BDM are classified as underbid-
ders, people who lost in the lottery but  rated the actual purchase price a good deal. In 
contrast, 9% of the participants in the BDM were considered as overbidders. The authors 
explain  the  limited  success  of  incentive-compatible  methods  in  actual  studies  with 
consumers' uncertainty of their own willingness-to-pay. 
In sum, the theoretical superiority of incentive compatibility could not be clearly shown in 
practice. The fact that the effects of the strategic bias and its correction in the form of 
incentive compatibility is disputed, makes its practical consideration within hypothetical 
measurements difficult.  But the case is  different for the well  documented hypothetical 
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bias. The reduction of the hypothetical bias in measurements of the contingent valuation 
seems a more promising area for improvements.  The need for hypothetical forecasting 
makes the elimination of hypothetical bias a central objective (Posavac, 2001). Therefore 
the correction of the hypothetical bias represents the focus of this study. 
4.2 Calibration of Hypothetical Measurements
In the literature, several methodological attempts towards the reduction of hypothetical 
bias exist. One approach was presented by Völckner (2006b), who sold the product of her 
survey  to  only  a  fraction  of  the  respondents.  10%  of  the  respondents  were  selected 
randomly to buy the product at their own previously stated willingness-to-pay. This proce-
dure could in fact reduce the hypothetical bias, as no significant differences between the 
10% and the 100% condition have been found in  almost  all  cases  (Völckner,  2006b). 
Further research is needed in order to verify the results of this study. However, even if this 
method effectively reduces the hypothetical bias, it does not fully eliminate the disadvan-
tages linked to real transactions between the researcher and the respondent and is there-
fore not seen as a sufficient solution.
Harrison and Rutström (2002) identified two categories of approaches for the elimination 
of hypothetical bias:  instrument calibration and statistical calibration. In the instrument  
calibration the hypothetical bias is tried to be eliminated by improving the wording of the 
questionnaire. An interesting proposition in this regard comes from Cummings and Taylor 
(1999), in which the respondents are explicitly informed and warned about the hypothet-
ical bias, the so-called  cheap-talk design. List  (2001, p. 1504) showed that the warning 
about the hypothetical bias can “mitigate hypothetical bias for certain consumer types” but 
not fully eliminate it, especially for respondents with experience in the market. A further 
application of the cheap talk design by Blumenschein et al.  (2008) revealed no overall 
reduction of the hypothetical bias. On the contrary, statistical calibration refers to elimi-
nating hypothetical bias via a statistical bias function (Blackburn et al., 1994), for which 
the size of the bias needs to be known. For illustration, Blackburn et al. (1994) provide an 
analogy with a watch that runs 10 minutes late. The error of the delay can be easily elimi-
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nated because its  size  is  known. The problem in the case of willingness-to-pay is  the 
unknown size of the error. The calibration function should be general and transferable to 
different  products,  samples  and  contexts  (Cummings  &  Taylor,  1999;  Fox,  Shogren, 
Hayes,  & Kliebenstein,  1998).  In  the  literature,  however,  constantly different  sizes  of 
hypothetical bias are found. Harrison and Rutström (2002) present an overview, in which 
the hypothetical bias ranges from understatements to overstatements of over 400 percent. 
Nevertheless Blackburn et al.  (1994) presented encouraging results for the possibility of 
calibrating  the  hypothetical  bias  on  the  basis  of  socio-economic  characteristics  of  a 
sample.  A semiparametric  model  exactly predicted that  “11% of the chocolate  sample 
would say yes to the real question given that they had already said yes to the hypothetical 
question” (Blackburn et al., 1994, p. 1087).  However, the sample size of this study was 
relatively small and it was lacking a theoretical reasoning, on which the calibration would 
occur and why socio-economic variables were used.
The most successful approach to calibrate hypothetical statements was probably done with 
certainty statements. This approach asks respondents to state how certain they are about 
their willingness-to-pay judgment in a follow-up question. This information was subse-
quently  used  to  calibrate  the  elicited  willingness-to-pay based  on  the  assumption  that 
higher certainty leads to more realistic results. Only answers of very certain participants 
were treated as valid estimations of willingness-to-pay. Two different types regarding the 
measurement of certainty can be differentiated. Either the degree of uncertainty on a 1-10 
scale from very uncertain to very certain is used or only two states of uncertainty are 
distinguished: probably sure or definitely sure (Blumenschein et al., 2008). 
Champ, Bishop, Brown and McCollum (1997) measured the respondents' certainty on a 
10-point scale and found that the percentage of hypothetical donations of respondents, 
who stated to be very certain with their response, featured no difference to the percentage 
of  real  donations  for  an  environmental  good.  In  contrast,  Johannesson,  Liljas  and 
Johansson  (1998) and  Blumenschein,  Johanesson,  Blomquist,  Liljas  and  O'Conor 
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(1998) measured certainty using the dichotomous options. The study of Johannesson et al. 
(1998) found that the number of people, who indicated to be absolutely sure about their 
intention to buy the box of chocolates for the set price was lower than the number of 
people who actually bought it  in the real  setting.  In the study of Blumenschein et  al. 
(1998) an  improved  formulation  of  the  two certainty options  resulted  in  an  effective 
approach to eliminate hypothetical bias in the form of no significant difference between 
calibrated hypothetical and real statements. A further encouraging and very recent result is 
provided  by Blumenschein  et  al.  (2008).  The  percentage  of  people  willing  to  buy an 
offered diabetes management system was twice as high in the contingent valuation (45%) 
compared to the real purchase setting (26%). The percentage of subjects being definitely  
sure was very close to the percentage of real purchases (24% versus 26%). The difference 
between the number of real purchases and the number of the certain purchase-intentions 
was  found  to  be  statistically  insignificant.  The  authors  conclude  that  “the  follow  up 
certainty approach is effective in removing the hypothetical bias”  (Blumenschein et al., 
2008, p. 123). 
Despite these successful results to calibrate hypothetical purchase intentions with certainty 
statements, the demand for an effective calibration method for the contingent valuation 
still prevails as some limitations and remarks to the presented studies need to be stressed. 
First of all, the majority of the studies featuring certainty as calibration method originate 
from the research on public goods. The possibility of a difference of the results between 
private and public goods should be considered (Johannesson et al., 1999). Nevertheless it 
may be worth to point out that the studies of Blumenschein et al. (1998) and Johannesson 
et al. (1998) were based on private goods, i.e. diabetes management program and a box of 
chocolates respectively. Furthermore, the applied definition of the term willingness-to-pay 
is different to the one used in the present study,  since the calibration of the discussed 
studies did not address exact monetary willingness-to-pay values. The calibration of hypo-
thetical statements was rather based on the percentage of purchases versus non-purchases 
and is probably better seen as covering willingness-to-buy statements. This means that 
people were confronted with a specific price for the product and chose either to buy or 
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not-to-buy. The calibration covered mere proportions of buyers and non-buyers rather than 
respondents'  willingness-to-pay  values.  Still,  several  different  price  points  could  be 
provided in order to derive a demand function  (e.g., Blumenschein et al., 2008). Addi-
tional to the previously discussed limitations of the dichotomous choice contingent valua-
tion, i. e.  the previously mentioned starting point bias and the difficult choice of price 
points, this measurement procedure limits the analysis with regard to the segmentation of 
the market, if concrete willingness-to-pay of each respondent is not assessed by subse-
quent questions. The results of the presented studies in any case fail to provide the previ-
ously mentioned importance of willingness-to-pay measurement on the individual level 
because of this design.
Nevertheless the successfully verified method of using respondent's certainty for the cali-
bration of their  hypothetical  statements  represents  a  valuable  finding and a promising 
starting point for further approaches and refinements. At the moment, only little back-
ground  on  the  theoretical  propositions  of  consumers'  certainty  has  been  discussed. 
Blumenschein et al.  (2008, p. 130) propose that the high certainty state better resembles 
the “response necessary to  make a  purchase in  real  market  situations.”  The choice of 
buying or not buying in the contingent valuation is a decision, which must be made imme-
diately. Only consumers, who are absolutely sure to buy a specific product are prepared to 
take out their wallet and put their money on the counter, whereas uncertain consumers are 
more likely to hesitate. 
Further  explanations  for  the theoretical  linkage between certainty and the accuracy of 
willingness-to-pay can be found in social psychology. The attitude-behavior framework 
has  been  applied  to  the  willingness-to-pay  statements  of  the  contingent  valuation 
(Blumenschein et al., 2008; Mitchell & Carson, 1990). Sample and Warland (1973) exam-
ined response uncertainty with regard to the prediction of behavior. This study investi-
gated students' attitude towards student government and their voting behavior in an under-
graduate student election. The results suggest that under high-certainty, attitude is a main 
predictor  of  both  intention  and  behavior  (Sample  &  Warland,  1973).  The  correlation 
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between attitude and the reported behavior denoted r = .06 for the low certainty group, 
whereas  r = .47 for the high certainty group. Furthermore, Fazio and Zanna  (1978a) as 
well  as  Raden  (1985) verify  the  moderating  role  of  certainty  in  attitude  predicting 
behavior  intentions  and  in  consequence  behavior.  The  attitude  behavior  correlations 
increased with the level of certainty, from .08 to .40 for the low uncertainty and high 
uncertainty group respectively. Fazio and Zanna (1978b) showed as well that respondents, 
who had a high confidence in a certain attitude, showed a significantly higher consistency 
between attitude and behavior than respondents with low confidence. 
Aside from Ajzen and Driver (1992), Fujii and Gärling (2003) interpret stated preferences 
as  behavioral  intention  and emphasize  the  increased  ability of  behavioral  intention  to 
predict behavior as it reflects a commitment to act and not only a desire to act. In the 
empirical  part  Japanese commuters were asked whether they would use the new built 
underground line with the following options: Yes, Yes to some degree or No. These options 
were included in order to reveal the degree of the behavioral intention for using the new 
public  transportation  line.  This  information  successfully  increased  the  match  between 
intention and behavior of the before- and after-panel survey. In sum, these results suggest 
that the certainty of a stated behavioral intention can be interpreted as an indicator of how 
strongly individuals intend to perform a certain behavior. “Intention strength is a factor 
that  increases  the likelihood that  an intention will  be implemented”  (Fujii  & Gärling, 
2003, p. 393). According to the theory of planned behavior, “it is found that when behav-
iors  pose  no  serious  problems of  control,  they can  be  predicted  from intentions  with 
considerable accuracy“ (Ajzen, 1991, p. 186). 
Given the presented empirical results and theoretical foundation of the importance of the 
individual certainty level for the predictability of hypothetical willingness-to-pay state-
ments, this study tries to extend this approach in order to calibrate individual willingness-
to-pay values elicited by the contingent valuation.  For this purpose, the question arises 
how uncertainty is best measured. The dichotomous choice options used by Blumenschein 
et al.  (2008) are inappropriate for the calibration of monetary willingness-to-pay values, 
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rather a more differentiated assessment of a consumers' certainty is needed. Likewise the 
second  approach  of  using  a  scale  for  the  uncertainty  measurement  (Champ  et  al., 
1997) appears too subjective to allow for a precise interpersonal comparability. Respon-
dents are likely to have similar perceptions of being absolutely certain or totally uncertain, 
but rating the personal certainty level on a 10-point scale seems too subjective. In addi-
tion, Blomquist, Blumenschein and Johannesson (2008) show that hypothetical statements 
of only the high end of the certainty scale correspond to real willingness-to-pay state-
ments. For the identification of a new way  of measuring consumers' uncertainty objec-
tively, a better understanding of the processes in consumers' minds when forming willing-
ness-to-pay judgments is needed. Thus, the sources and reasons for individual consumers' 
uncertainty are attempted to be identified and consequently used to achieve objective and 
easily measurable calibration criteria.
4.3 Consumer Characteristics and Uncertainty in Willingness-to-Pay
In general, the central assumption of all current measurement methods is that consumers 
know with  certainty their  willingness-to-pay for  a  product  (Hanemann,  1984;  Heiner, 
1985; Wang et al., 2007). It is astonishing that the assumption of respondent's ability to 
derive  their  willingness-to-pay  with  certainty  is  still  applied  (DuBourg,  Jones-Lee,  & 
Loomes, 1997), despite the fact that references to the respondent's difficulty in the elicita-
tion of their willingness-to-pay can be found in the literature. A frequently cited study 
regarding the cognitive difficulties in willingness-to-pay elicitation comes from Brown et 
al. (1996). Although this argumentation should demonstrate the superiority of the dichoto-
mous choice approach, it may be extended to other open-ended measurement methods as 
well  (Kaas & Ruprecht,  2006).  The cognitive difficulty for the respondents may be a 
reason why some people state a willingness-to-pay of zero while others provide relative 
high figures in the open ended contingent method  (e.g., Boyle, Johnson, McCollum, & 
Desvousges, 1996). Gregory et al. (1993) conclude that respondents did not have precise 
monetary representations of their values for concrete environmental projects. As already 
noted,  Völckner  (2006a) questions  the  assumption  of  rational  decision-making  in  the 
context of incentive compatible methods. Kaas and Ruprecht (2006) indicate that respon-
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dents are unfamiliar with the situation of formulating their preferences in the form of will-
ingness-to-pay. Likewise, respondents are in general not aware of their preferences and 
thus these may be unstable over time  (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998). On the basis of 
these formulations, Kaas and Ruprecht (2006) establish a modified bidding model under 
uncertainty and show that the risk-averse bidder has a tendency to underestimate. 
In  combination  with  the  presented  results  of  successfully  calibrating  hypothetical 
methods, the theoretical considerations give reason to assume that some consumers are 
more certain than others concerning their willingness-to-pay for a specific product. The 
specific characteristics of the consumers which lead to uncertain responses are of partic-
ular importance for this  study's  objective.  Indications for the importance of individual 
consumer  characteristics  can  be  found  in  the  literature.  Sichtmann  and  Stingel 
(2007) differentiated the willingness-to-pay elicitation of a conjoint analysis and an incen-
tive compatible auction between a low and high involvement state. Via online interviews, 
they sold regular telephone minutes, representing low involvement condition, and UMTS 
contracts as high involvement products, as the UMTS technology just entered the market 
at  that  time.  The  conjoint  analysis  showed  higher  willingness-to-pay  values  than  the 
auction. In contrast, the conjoint analysis tends to underestimate willingness-to-pay in low 
involvement situations. Thus, the respondent's level of involvement is likely to moderate 
the willingness-to-pay measurement among different methods. 
The study of List  (2001) applies Cummings and Taylor's  (1999) approach of a “Cheap 
Talk design” and revealed that its effect depends on the market experience of respondents. 
The dealers of sportscards were “immune” to the warnings about hypothetical  bias, in 
contrast to the group of nondealers. Furthermore, studies exist which address the impor-
tance of  consumer  demographics  on willingness-to-pay measurements.  Tscheuling and 
Blaimont  (1993) reveal a significant influence of education levels and profession on the 
validity of the conjoint  analysis  and conclude that  the results  of  conjoint  analysis  are 
highly dependent on the composition of the sample. However, Sattler, Hensel-Börner and 
Krüger (2001) present contradicting results and find no significant influences of consumer 
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demographics on preference measures for coffee, refrigerators and bus journeys in a study 
with over 700 respondents. Nape, Frykblom, Harrison and Lesley (2003) provide results 
of significant influences of the consumer demographics personal income, race and age on 
willingness-to-accept,  although this  study must  be  considered  as  an  exploratory study 
without formulated hypotheses and explanations of their results. 
Wang et  al.  (2007) use  a  consumer's  uncertainty with  willingness-to-pay estimates  as 
central  starting point for their new measurement approach ICERANGE where willing-
ness-to-pay is defined as a range rather than a single point. In their theoretical elaboration, 
they differentiate consumers' uncertainty in product performance/quality uncertainty and 
consumers' preference uncertainty. Urbany, Dickson and Wilkie  (1989, p. 208) made an 
equivalent differentiation regarding a consumer's uncertainty via factor analysis: “uncer-
tainty regarding what is known about the alternatives (knowledge uncertainty) and uncer-
tainty  regarding  which  alternative  to  choose  (choice  uncertainty).”  Furthermore,  they 
found that choice uncertainty and knowledge uncertainty are strongly related. Approxi-
mately 70% of the respondents were classified as either low in both categories or high in 
both categories. 
This differentiation of consumers' uncertainty in the decision making process (Urbany et 
al., 1989) and its relevance for willingness-to-pay measurements  (Wang et al., 2007) is 
used as a starting point for the following in-depth analysis. In purchase situations, knowl-
edge uncertainty refers to a consumer's inability to evaluate a product's quality and future 
performance (Urbany et al., 1989). In order to determine the personal willingness-to-pay, 
the consumer has to assess product quality. The previously stated definition of willing-
ness-to-pay as a direct monetary measure of product value (Kalish & Nelson, 1991) illus-
trates the critical  relationship between the consumers'  evaluation of a product and the 
resulting willingness-to-pay. The inadequate assessment of a product's quality can be char-
acterized as a problem of missing information (Rao & Sieben, 1992). The consumer needs 
to exert a higher effort in processing the available information and inferring the missing 
information (Shugan, 1980). The consumer, however, is not a perfect rational individual 
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with perfect information processing but owns only limited processing capability (Simon, 
1955). It is not possible for a consumer to know whether he or she will be satisfied with a 
car before the purchase. There are too many attributes, technical specifications and hidden 
error sources to form a complete picture of the car's product quality. Hence, respondents 
can not assess a  product's  quality with certainty but can only estimate although some 
consumers can evaluate quality better than others. Involvement and product knowledge 
are seen as important personal factors in this respect.
4.4 Product Involvement
The involvement construct is broadly defined as “a person's perceived relevance of the 
object based on inherent needs, values, and interests”  (Zaichkowsky, 1985, p. 342) The 
level of involvement in a purchase situation reflects the interest towards a specific product 
category  and  the  perceived  importance  of  making  the  right  decision.  Three  different 
sources of involvement have been identified. Involvement can be either personal, physical 
or situational. Personal involvement is related to inherent needs and values. A gourmet is, 
for instance, generally more concerned about the quality of the restaurant's food than an 
average guest. Physical involvement results from characteristics of the object, which leads 
to a differentiation and increase of interest. The probability of reading a received hand-
written letter rather than an e-mail is, for instance, likely to be higher. Finally situational 
involvement applies to a  temporarily increased relevance or interest  in an object.  The 
personal importance of choosing a particularly nice present for your partner's birthday is 
probably higher than a present for your grandfather's birthday  (Bloch & Richins, 1983; 
Houston & Rothschild, 1978; Zaichkowsky, 1985). 
Another differentiation is found by Park and Young (1986), involvement has two dimen-
sions: cognitive and affective.  The cognitive involvement represents the personal rele-
vance of message contents concerning a brand's functional performance while affective 
involvement means the personal relevance of a message based on emotional or aesthetic 
consequences to one's self-image towards the outside world. Whether the involvement is 
affective  or  cognitive  depends  on  the  interaction  of  the  stimulus  and  the  respondent 
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(Zaichkowsky,  1994).  From these examples  it  can be seen that  involvement  is  a  very 
broad concept finding application in advertising and purchase situations. But it has also 
been identified as a key construct in the decision making process (Burnkrant & Sawyer, 
1983; Gensch & Javalgi, 1987; Greenwald & Leavitt, 1984). 
In principle, the level of involvement indicates how important a problem is to an indi-
vidual and influences how much search effort is put into arriving at a decision. Involve-
ment's motivation on search effort and processing has been well established in the litera-
ture (Laurent & Kapferer, 1985; Seiders, Voss, Grewal, & Godfrey, 2005; Bloch, Sherrell, 
& Ridgway, 1986). Highly involved consumers in contrast to low involved consumers are 
actively seeking information, compare the product attributes more thoroughly and differ-
entiate better between different brands (Zaichkowsky, 1985). Furthermore, Engel, Black-
well and Miniard  (1995, p. 161) define involvement as a major condition for “extended 
problem solving behavior”. 
More  specifically,  Celsi  and  Olson  (1988) investigated  the  differences  of  consumers' 
attention and comprehension processes after manipulating their situational and enduring 
levels of involvement. “In sum, greater levels of felt involvement should affect the amount 
of effort, the focus of attention and comprehension processes, and the number and type of 
meanings produced by comprehension processes” (Celsi & Olson, 1988, p. 213). Highly 
involved consumers are motivated to attend longer as well as comprehend more informa-
tion in a buying situation. 
Chaiken (1980) showed that the level of involvement does not simply affect the motiva-
tion to process information, moreover she classified two different strategies how to deal 
with information based on different levels  of involvement.  Chaiken  (1980) contrasts  a 
systematic with an heuristic information processing strategy depending on the level of 
involvement. “In essence, a systematic view of persuasion emphasizes detailed processing 
of message content and the role of message based cognitions in mediating opinion change, 
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whereas a heuristic view de-emphasizes detailed information processing and focuses on 
the role of simple rules or cognitive heuristics in mediating persuasion” (Chaiken, 1980, p. 
752). 
The advantage of a heuristic information processing strategy is the minimized cognitive 
effort  used  and thereby making a  decision  faster  and  more  convenient.  However,  the 
drawbacks are obviously the limited reliability of the resulting decision. Respondents will 
prefer a systematic strategy when the benefits for a reliable decision outweigh the efforts 
in analyzing and processing the information, in short, when respondents perceive a deci-
sion as important. Respondents using the systematic strategy derive their evaluations from 
message characteristics, e.g., plausibility of argumentation, whereas the heuristic strategy 
is based on source characteristics, e.g., trustfulness in information source (Chaiken, 1980). 
Hence,  the  highly  involved  consumer  is  a  critical  information  processor,  while  low 
involved consumers try to use shortcuts in decision making. People with low involvement 
likely rely on a friend's advice, on high-quality retailers or on other indicators of product 
quality seen as trustworthy. An application of Chaiken's (1980) theory to the field of will-
ingness-to-pay measurement can be found in a study by Ajzen and Driver (1992, p. 299); 
“In the absence of  the required motivation or ability,  judgments  tend to  proceed in  a 
peripheral mode, relying on situational cues or other nonsubstantive considerations.” 
The study of Mitra (1995) empirically confirmed and expanded these results. In the study, 
the  respondents  were  confronted  with  two different  types  of  offers.  In  the  congruent 
settings the price and the attributes were both either positively or negatively formulated. 
In  the  incongruent  condition,  the  offers  featured  inconsistencies  between  price  and 
attributes, i. e. the price was presented as low (high) and the attributes as strong (weak). 
The  higher  effort  in  product  evaluation  was  shown  to  be  significantly  higher  in  the 
increased  motivation  setting. Under  low motivation  only price-based  inferences  influ-
enced the evaluation in both conditions. On the contrary, under high-motivation a different 
behavior was revealed. Attribute-based inferences prevailed in the incongruent situation 
whereas both price- and attribute-based inferences were used in the congruent condition. 
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In other words, the degree of motivation determines which type of product information is 
used and how extensive the evaluation turns out to be. Whereas low motivated consumers 
could not distinguish the advantageous offers from the unfavorable ones, the highly moti-
vated sample could indeed differentiate by processing attributes and price information. 
In essence, involved consumers have been found to use more criteria in their decision 
making (Zaichkowsky, 1985, 1988), search for more information  (Celsi & Olson, 1988; 
Laurent & Kapferer, 1985) and process relevant information more thoroughly (Chaiken, 
1980; Mishra, Umesh, & Stem, 1993). Additionally involvement should also lead to an 
increased interest in the study, which should also positively affect the quality of the results 
(Wittink & Bergestuen, 2001). The increased attention and comprehension will enhance a 
consumer's ability to evaluate a product. Especially in the cognitively demanding situation 
of deriving the personal willingness-to-pay for a product, the level of involvement can be 
considered to play a decisive role. Due to the increased information processing, products 
can be evaluated more effectively and more reliably.  Hence, the involved consumer is 
supposed  to  determine  a  product's  performance  with  higher  certainty.  A consumer's 
reduced uncertainty should lead to better predictions on the basis of hypothetical state-
ments. This theory is moreover supported by Mishra et al.  (1993, pp. 340-341):“as the 
respondents become more involved with the choice task, they process the information 
better and are more consistent in their decision making.” This consistency of involved 
consumers should positively affect the two elicitation formats of hypothetical (e.g., CV) 
and real  contexts (e.g.,  BDM).  On the basis of these findings and in accordance with 
Chandrashekaran  (2001,  p.  87),  who identified “the need for disaggregate  analyses  of 
consumers'  choice“  for  the  state  of  involvement,  product  involvement  is  supposed  to 
moderate  consumers'  hypothetical  elicitation  of  willingness-to-pay.  Consequently,  the 
following hypothesis is formulated:
H1 – Highly involved individuals provide a hypothetically stated willingness-to-pay 
better predicting real purchase behavior than low involved individuals.
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Interestingly, the study of Bei and Widdows (1999) tested two hypotheses contradictory to 
the theory discussed above. The authors supposed that the effect of product information on 
low involved consumers is greater than on highly involved consumers. They formed the 
hypothesis that the effect of providing consumers with complex information is greatest for 
low involved and knowledgeable consumers. The rationale behind these two hypotheses 
was based on the reduced price consciousness and the increased brand loyalty of highly 
involved consumers. In this study involved consumers are supposed to already own too 
static attitudes or beliefs thereby hindering the acceptance of new information. It has to be 
stated that these two  hypotheses of information usage of involved consumers were not 
significantly ( p > 0.10) proven by Bei and Widdows  (1999),  H5:  F(1,271) = 2.39,  p  > 
0.10 and H6: F(1, 271) = 0.38, p > 0.10. 
The  question  arises  why product  involvement  and  product  knowledge  are  considered 
separately. Product involvement and product knowledge are known to be correlated. This 
correlation has been empirically tested in several studies, but both concepts have been 
treated  separately.  Sujan  (1985) for  instance  found  a  significant  correlation  between 
involvement and product  knowledge (r = .51),  but  concluded “that knowledge has an 
independent  effect  on processing,  and  that  involvement  or  interest  cannot  explain  the 
pattern of results obtained” (Sujan, 1985, p. 44). In Zaichkowsky's  (1988) study surpris-
ingly no relationship was found (r = -.08), although she admits that the questions used 
“[do]  not  seem  to  be  a  reliable  tool  for  measuring  knowledge  of  wine  to  average 
consumers.”  (Zaichkowsky, 1988, p. 326). Considering the study of Bei and Widdow's 
(1999) correlation measure between knowledge and involvement was also rather low (r 
= .22)  whereas  the  results  of  Celsi  and  Olson  (1988) show the  diverse  influences  of 
product knowledge and product involvement quite clearly. Knowledge is “related to the 
focus  comprehension  processes  and  the  elaborative  inferences  produced  by  these 
processes”  (Celsi  & Olson,  1988, p.  221). Involvement on the contrary influences the 
attention and comprehension processing. Knowledge has the highest effect on the product 
judgments, whereas the motivational state of involvement determined the amount of effort 
in attention and comprehension. In simple terms, involvement can be understood as moti-
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vation to process and search; product knowledge can be seen as ability to process (Celsi 
& Olson, 1988). Highly knowledgeable consumers do not necessarily have a motivation to 
use their internally stored information, if they perceive the decision as non-relevant. Simi-
larly, high involvement does not always lead to skillful decisions. 
4.5 Product Knowledge
Product knowledge is defined to “encompass the amount of accurate information held in 
memory about  product  alternatives  as  well  as  buyers'  self-perceptions  of  this  product 
knowledge”  (Rao  &  Monroe,  1988,  p.  255).  Furthermore,  Alba  and  Hutchinson 
(1987) propose  that  product  knowledge  is  based  on  two  components:  familiarity  and 
expertise.  Familiarity  refers  to  the  product  related  experiences  a  consumer  has  made, 
whereas expertise is the “ability to perform product-related tasks successfully”  (Alba & 
Hutchinson, 1987, p. 411). For illustration, think of the different kind of knowledge a race 
car driver has compared to his/her technician. The race car driver has learned to control 
the car by repetition (familiarity), but his/her technician knows every single part and also 
which one to modify in order to achieve the maximum performance (expertise). The defi-
nitions of both components are relatively broad: advertising exposures and interactions 
with salespersons increase the consumers' familiarity with a product and simple beliefs 
about product attributes enrich consumers' expertise. Furthermore a higher level of famil-
iarity generally results also in a higher level of consumer expertise (Alba & Hutchinson, 
1987). 
When structuring different products, consumers tend to use a mental scale for orientation 
in order to classify similarities and dissimilarities. The dimension, on which this classifi-
cation occurs, is referred to as the basic level, “objects tend to be spontaneously named at 
this level, and discrimination at this level tends to be easier than at other levels.” (Alba & 
Hutchinson, 1987, p. 415) In this context, two issues concerning expertise appear relevant 
for  the  reduction  of  uncertainty  in  the  decision-making  process:  first,  knowledgeable 
consumers have an increased ability to discriminate  below the basic level. This means, 
familiar consumers may distinguish products based on smaller differences, e.g., discrimi-
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nation  of  wine  based  on  the  grape,  the  year  and  the  region  of  origin.  Second,  more 
familiar consumers are furthermore able to discriminate at a more abstract level,  above 
the basic level, – e.g., typical classifications at the basic level for food would be vegeta-
bles, meat, fruits. Beyond this, one could discriminate between high and low protein foods 
and establish cross-references. This advanced discrimination requires knowledge above 
normal level. The development of categories above the basic level enables experts to eval-
uate a more heterogeneous set of alternatives compared to novices, whereas the formed 
categories below the basic level allow the evaluation of a more homogeneous set of alter-
natives. Lastly, the deeper categorization structure prevents the expert from overgeneral-
izing and undergeneralizing (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987). Besides experts having more and 
stronger links among concepts (Chi & Koeske, 1983), they own a better organization of 
their knowledge rendering the information processing more efficient  (Fiske, Kinder, & 
Larter, 1983). Because of the better organization and experience product knowledge liber-
ates cognitive resources, which the expert can then devote to the acquisition of new infor-
mation (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987). 
Increased product familiarity eases consumer decision-making in the way that repetition 
reduces the necessary cognitive effort. As a task becomes more and more common, the 
individual's learning process speeds up the execution but keeps the performance constant. 
This effort reduction occurs already after a few experiences with the product  (Alba & 
Hutchinson, 1987). Applied to the purchase situation, high familiarity consumers should 
be able to derive a buying decision faster and more easily due to their experience. 
Product knowledge is a key determinant of consumers' search behavior in the form of 
influencing the source of information and selecting the degree of analysis of incoming 
information (Marks & Olson, 1981). Experts are looking for specific information, because 
they know they exist and perceive them as important, whereas novices are more depen-
dent on the information they receive (Brucks, 1985). Additionally experts are able to focus 
their evaluation on the most relevant and important characteristics and screen out less 
interesting  cues  (Alba  & Hutchinson,  1987).  Prior  knowledge enables  a  weighting  of 
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attributes  according  to  their  relevance.  When  buying  a  computer  in  a  store,  we  can 
imagine the novice to rely on brief product descriptions, prices and brands, evaluating 
each information to the same degree. In contrast, the expert would focus on attributes he 
or she knows are crucial for a high quality computer: processor, hard drive space, energy-
efficiency while neglecting other cues he or she perceives less relevant. If an important 
product characteristic is missing, the expert is able to explicitly ask for that specific infor-
mation. 
Experts  have also been shown to process more inconsistent  information than novices, 
which is seen as a proof of increased efficiency of experts' processing (Fiske et al., 1983). 
Further investigations of Sujan (1985) showed that experts either rely on their categoriza-
tion structures if the provided information is congruent with their prior knowledge or start 
analytical processes if product information conflicts with their categorization. Novices on 
the contrary lack this increased ability of processing product relevant information and are 
more  susceptible  to  product  category  labels  instead  of  real  product  attributes  (Sujan, 
1985). Additionally novices were found to use more subjective information and recom-
mendations (King & Balasubramanian, 1994). This behavior can be interpreted as a sign 
of increased uncertainty.
The provided literature clearly indicates that knowledgeable consumers in general have an 
increased ability in  assessing the quality of a  product.  Experts  evaluate  more product 
information due to their better organized internal knowledge structures. It has been clearly 
validated that consumers with higher levels of product knowledge make better  assess-
ments  of  product  quality  (Rao  &  Monroe,  1988).  Park  and  Lessig (1981) moreover 
provide results which suggest that respondents' confidence in choice decision increases 
with the level of familiarity. The positive relationship between knowledge and confidence 
in the validity of the knowledge is also put forward by Fiske, Kinder and Larter  (1983). 
Garb's results  (1989) suggest that  experience leads to better knowledge which of their 
judgments could be correct and which judgments could be incorrect. Finally, Heath and 
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Tversky (1991) show that highly knowledgeable people in contrast to low knowledgeable 
people even pay a premium for betting on their own judgments rather than a randomly 
drawn solution. 
These results strongly support the assumption that a better assessment of product perfor-
mance or quality decreases a consumer's uncertainty.  Experts process information more 
extensively and are able to better articulate evaluations of products, which are internally 
consistent and stable over time  (de Bont & Schoormans, 1995). More specifically,  for 
familiar products the identification of the personal willingness-to-pay may likely be easier 
than  for  products  which  are  relatively  unknown  to  the  consumer  (Fischhoff,  1991; 
Völckner, 2006a). Similar to product involvement, product knowledge is seen to decrease 
consumers' uncertainty in evaluating product quality due to more and better product infor-
mation. The higher confidence in willingness-to-pay statements in turn should effectively 
moderate the predictability of the contingent valuation measurement. This relationship is 
formulated as hypothesis: 
H2 – Highly knowledgeable individuals provide a hypothetically stated willingness-
to-pay better predicting real purchase behavior than low knowledgeable individ-
uals.
4.6 The Price as Missing Cue
The increased ability to infer product quality of involved and knowledgeable consumers 
can also be seen from a different perspective, which also supports the hypothesis stated 
above. The quality perception process can be seen as a function of cue utilization (Olson, 
1972). The term cue is defined as any informational stimuli of a product, that can be used 
to  evaluate  a  product  before  consumption  (Steenkamp,  1990).  Extrinsic  cues  are  not 
directly related to product performance, whereas intrinsic cues are in fact physical product 
characteristics  (Rao & Monroe, 1989). An intrinsic attribute cannot be changed without 
changing the product. Typical examples for extrinsic information are the country of origin, 
the brand or the price, in contrast to the intrinsic information of ingredients or color. These 
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attributes provide information, but are not part of the product itself. Consumers usually 
consider both types of cues and use their prior knowledge for creating meaning to cues 
(Olson, 1972, 1978). Among others, prices are commonly used as quality indicators (Hair 
Jr,  Anderson,  Tatham,  & Black,  1995).  The price quality relationship is  based on the 
assumption that the interaction of demand and supply will lead to cheapest prices. In this 
regard, the only reason for a higher price would be the usage of superior inputs or high 
quality fabrication (Scitovsky, 1945). Gerstner (1985) evaluated this positive relationship 
between quality and price for over 100 products and found in general only a weak correla-
tion (r = .19 for nonfrequently and r = .01 for frequently bought products). The relation-
ship between quality and price depends, however, on the product category. 
In willingness-to-pay surveys where the price is not provided as a product attribute, the 
consumer  needs  to  evaluate  the  products  according  to  intrinsic  attributes  to  a  greater 
extent. The You get what you pay for of typical shopping situations changes to You pay for  
what you get in the willingness-to-pay context  (Rao & Sieben, 1992). This situation is 
new for  the  consumer,  since  the  accustomed  situation  for  a  consumer  is  to  choose  a 
product based on his/her preferences and the provided information he has, including the 
price information (Ruprecht, 2005). 
Research showed that segments may differ in the importance they place on the price when 
evaluating  products  (Rao  & Monroe,  1988).  Etgar  and  Malhotra  (1981) for  instance 
demonstrated  that  consumers  can  be  grouped  on  the  basis  of  differing  price-quality 
perceptions.  “Although  price  was  a  highly  important  cue  for  some  quality  facets,  its 
importance was relatively small  for others”  (Etgar & Malhotra,  1981, p.  221).  In this 
context, product knowledge helps to discriminate consumers according to their usage of 
extrinsic information. Rao and Monroe  (1988) and Park and Lessig  (1981) showed the 
moderating  role  of  product  knowledge  on  information  use.  Low  knowledgeable 
consumers primarily use extrinsic product information, because they lack the knowledge 
to  assess quality correctly.  In contrast,  moderately familiar  consumers focus solely on 
intrinsic information, whereas highly familiar buyers have acquired enough information to 
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make use of extrinsic product cues additionally to intrinsic ones. Hence, experts are able 
to use both information and will prefer to use extrinsic attributes, if they are reliable indi-
cators of quality, otherwise they will use their knowledge to evaluate the product's specifi-
cation. As a result, low familiar buyers use the price cue because of the general belief of a 
price-quality relationship, while experts use the price cue because of their knowledge of a 
price-quality relationship for a certain product (Rao & Sieben, 1992; Rao & Olson, 1990). 
Furthermore, experts not only know how to assess the price-quality relationship, but they 
will additionally learn the market's price levels, which in turn influences their willingness-
to-pay (Rao & Sieben, 1992).  Consumers without price knowledge hold a lower accept-
able price level (Fouilhe, 1970; Kosenko & Rahtz, 1988) and knowledgeable consumers 
were shown to adapt the market's price range as their willingness-to-pay (Rao & Sieben, 
1992). 
Furthermore, Zaichkowsky (1988) proved that involvement affects the usage of price in 
product evaluation. Although low and highly involved consumers had to pay the same 
price for the same product “the low involved individuals placed more emphasis on price in 
their  evaluation  of  the  alternatives  than  the  high  involved individuals”  (Zaichkowsky, 
1988, p. 326). For low involved consumers product evaluation is rather seen as a burden, 
therefore price as a low effort attribute is preferred. The highly involved consumers on the 
contrary value complex information because the outcome is highly relevant to them. As 
active information seeker they reach a point where they can differentiate the products very 
precisely according  to  the  intrinsic  product  specifications.  The  set  of  decision  factors 
enlarges while involvement increases thereby at the same time decreasing the relevance of 
a single attribute, for instance the price. Involvement leads to a shift of importance from 
the simple, extrinsic attribute price to the more complex intrinsic product characteristics. 
“In other words, as involvement goes up relative weight given to the price cue goes down 
in evaluating alternatives for probability of purchase” (Zaichkowsky, 1988, p. 326). 
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The different usage of the price as cue indicates that quality assessments can be made 
more thoroughly with increased knowledge and involvement  in  the willingness-to-pay 
context. If the consumer is used to depend on the price as an indicator for product quality 
he or she will have difficulties in the evaluation when a price as cue is missing. In this 
case,  a  higher  uncertainty concerning  product  performance  evaluation  is  likely.  These 
considerations support the already elaborated hypotheses that  involvement and product 
knowledge increase the certainty in determining product evaluations but from a different 
perspective. Involved and knowledgeable consumers are willing and able to use product 
attributes for the determination of product quality.
4.7 Preference Uncertainty
Besides  product  quality  uncertainty,  preference  uncertainty  has  been  identified  as  the 
second category of consumers' uncertainty in willingness-to-pay statements (Urbany et al., 
1989; Wang et al., 2007). Fischer, Luce and Jia (2000, p. 88) define preference uncertainty 
among  two  alternatives  as  “being  not  sure  which  alternative  one  prefers,  or  to  what 
degree.” Ambivalence or preference uncertainty arises when alternatives are good in one 
respect  but  bad  in  another  one.  This  characteristic  is  referred  to  as  attribute  conflict 
(Fischer et al., 2000). A potential buyer needs to outweigh the advantages and disadvan-
tages according to his/her preferences, which may lead to preference uncertainty (Fischer 
et al., 2000). If the attributes are at the very high or very low end of the attribute scale the 
evaluation is easier. Such values leave less possibility to trade the attribute off due to their 
extremity  (Fischer et al.,  2000). The difficulty in preference formation depends on the 
amount of alternatives and their attributes. Whichever choice is made, the decision maker 
is  likely to  experience  feelings  of  regret  or  emotional  loss  for  giving  up the positive 
features of the foregone alternative (Fischer et al., 2000). Another possible source for pref-
erence uncertainty is when consumers are not familiar with the situation (March, 1978). 
However, even if the consumer has perfect information he or she may still be uncertain 
about his/her own preference (March, 1978; Wang et al., 2007). 
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The consumers'  goals may also lead to inconsistent decisions.  He or she may want to 
minimize the cognitive effort, maximizing the accuracy, minimizing negative emotions, 
maximizing  the  ease  of  justification  or  a  combination  of  these  goals  (Bettman et  al., 
1998). The goal of high accuracy is certainly conflicting with the goal of a low cognitive 
effort leading to different preferences. Depending on personal goals, a consumer's deci-
sion strategy in a purchase situation may vary from complex to very simple or selective. 
Selective decision making would mean just to focus on a single attribute, e.g., buying the 
safest car. Complex decision strategies include various attributes and finding an algorithm 
how to relate them to each other. The weighted additive value model is a prominent deci-
sion strategy (Fischer et al., 2000). Each attribute of an alternative is rated and then multi-
plied by a value representing the value of the attribute. The resulting values are summed 
up for a final ranking of alternatives. The consumer may be uncertain especially how to 
trade off single alternatives. Thinking about buying a new car; what would be one's trade 
off  rate  for energy efficiency to horsepower? Trading off  attributes against  each other 
requires much more cognitive resources than simpler forms of decision making (Bettman 
et al., 1998). 
The  trade-off  shows  not  only  how  extensive  such  processes  can  be,  they  also  mean 
evolving decisions  accompanied  by negative emotion.  Humans do not  simply process 
information like computers. In general a perceived loss is weighted more than a perceived 
gain, known as loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). These negative emotions can 
be avoided if a simpler choice criterion is used. Another possible goal of choice decision 
is  the ease of  justification.  Decisions are  often reassessed either  by oneself  or  others. 
Some  personal  preferences  may for  instance  conflict  with  other  people's  preferences, 
which are accounted for in decision making. “Choices are often made without respect to 
tastes. Human decision-makers routinely ignore their own, fully conscious, preferences in 
making decisions.  They follow rules,  traditions,  hunches,  and the advice or actions of 
others“ (March, 1978, p. 596). 
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By interpreting willingness-to-pay as preference statements (Ryan & San Miguel, 2000), 
the problem arises that the underlying preferences are often not existing. People obviously 
do not always have stable and well-articulated preferences, but rather construct them on 
the spot (Bettman et al., 1998). Instead of revealing preferences people often have to form 
them during the decision making process. “Consumer preference formation may be more 
like  architecture,  building  some  defensible  set  of  values,  rather  than  like  archeology, 
uncovering values that  are already there“  (Bettman et al.,  1998, p. 188). Of particular 
importance for the willingness-to-pay measurement is that these ad hoc formed prefer-
ences are in general not stable. “One of the most important principles resulting from the 
past 15 years of research in decision making is that when preferences are constructed at 
the  time  of  measurement,  rather  than  retrieved  from something  the  consumer  knows 
already, the trade-offs elicited are unstable and can be easily changed by small changes in 
measurement procedure” (Hoeffler, 2003, p. 406).
As a result, preference uncertainty leads to a stronger influence of procedural and descrip-
tive effects on respondent's expressed preferences  (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992). 
Framing effects are prominent examples of such influences. Framing effects refer to the 
impact  the  presentation  (e.g.,  the  wording)  of  the  alternative  has  on  the  respondent's 
answer (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The method of asking can make a difference to the 
outcome. The form of presentation may affect  the respondent's  preferences,  especially 
when the respondent is ambiguous (Payne et al., 1992). The shelf position of a chocolate 
bar  is  likely  to  have  an  influence  on  an  ambiguous  consumer  in  his/her  preference 
construction. 
Consumers who are familiar and experienced with a product are more likely to own well-
defined  preferences  and  their  behavior  follows  rational  choice  theory  more  closely 
(Bettman et  al.,  1998).  More specifically,  Wang et  al.  (2007) found that the greater  a 
consumer's preference uncertainty for a product, the greater is his/her range in willing-
ness-to-pay for the product.  In contrast,  a  high preference strength means a clear  and 
stable decision structure (Mishra et al., 1993). Similarly, Fischer et al. (2000, p. 90) stated 
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that “greater preference uncertainty should be associated with greater response error – that 
is, greater inconsistency between a particular decision maker's evaluation of an identical 
stimulus at different times.” Preference uncertainty likely leads to a larger fluctuation of 
willingness-to-pay. It is reasonable to suppose higher difficulties with the elicitation of 
reservation prices. Especially in metric terms, uncertainty hinders to arrive at a value for 
the degree of preference (Fischer et al., 2000). 
Some people are believed to already hold strong preference schemes for a certain product 
category, others are probably more unclear, what fits them best (Bettman et al., 1998). The 
honest determination of the maximum price one is willing to pay is not a trivial task, but 
rather a laborious, cognitive process. Some respondents do not only need to decide which 
product attribute to weigh, but also what their preferences are. The determination of will-
ingness-to-pay values from unspecified preferences is supposed to be difficult. Further-
more,  research  has  shown  that  these  preferences  are  less  stable.  Hence,  respondents 
should differ in their ability to arrive at their willingness-to-pay (DuBourg et al., 1997). 
H3 – Individuals having well-defined preferences provide a hypothetically stated 
willingness-to-pay better  predicting real  purchase behavior than individuals who 
are uncertain about their own preferences.
5 Empirical Study
5.1 Methodology
The proposed causal relationships between the discussed consumer characteristics and the 
uncertainty in willingness-to-pay responses can be implemented in a regression model in 
order to forecast true willingness-to-pay. According to the established hypotheses, the true 
willingness-to-pay values as dependent variable can be predicted by its relationship with 
the contingent valuation method and the discussed consumer characteristics (involvement, 
product  knowledge  and  preference  uncertainty)  as  moderators  of  this  relationship.  A 
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moderation effect exists if the relationship of two variables varies as a function of a third 
variable, the moderator  (Zedeck, 1971). For a validation of this forecasting method, the 
moderation effects first need to be verified. 
Two studies with equal study design have been conducted accordingly via face-to-face 
interviews. Chocolate bars were chosen as the subject of the study, as they represent a 
cheap mass-moving commodity people can easily afford. These have also been used in 
other pricing studies (Bhatia & Fox-Rushby, 2003; Johannesson, Liljas, & O'Conor, 1997; 
Kaas & Ruprecht, 2006; Wang et al., 2007). Two different brands with different flavors 
were sold: Hachez – milk chocolate and Feodora – dark chocolate. Both brands are in the 
mid  price  range,  1.20€  to  2.10€  and  both  brands  have  only  small  market  shares  in 
Germany, thereby reducing likely anchor effects of remembered existing market prices. 
The small market share further is likely to prevent the respondents to use the brand as a 
cue in the decision process. 
Both studies featured a within-group design in the form that every respondent provided 
willingness-to-pay judgments for the preferred chocolate bar in a contingent valuation and 
a BDM lottery. In the first study 357 travelers at a major German airport and in the second 
study 214 business students of a German university took part in the research project. The 
airport sample is considered as more heterogeneous. Not all respondents answered the 
contingent valuation question and participated in the BDM lottery and thus were removed 
from the analysis. From the initial 357 participants 268 respondents remained in the first 
study,  AIR  sample,  and  from 214  people  186  respondents  in  the  second  study,  UNI 
sample.
The respondents were not informed about the purpose of the studies. First,  consumers 
answered the contingent valuation question; how much respondents would maximally pay 
for  the  two  chocolate  bars.  Second,  participants  were  asked  about  their  consumption 
behavior, for instance about their favorite brands of chocolate bars. These questions aimed 
at reducing the focus on willingness-to-pay but were not part of the analysis itself. Addi-
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tionally, their individual levels of product involvement, brand knowledge, familiarity and 
preference uncertainty were assessed. In the last step, the respondents were buying their 
preferred chocolate bar via the BDM lottery. The BDM mechanism was explained to the 
respondents as well as the reason why the best strategy was to state their true willingness-
to-pay, analogous to the study of Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002). The price distribution of 
the lottery was not communicated to the respondents in order to avoid anchoring effects 
(Bohm et al., 1997). All respondents had the opportunity to take a closer look and examine 
the  products  packaging details.  Furthermore,  the participants  were informed that  their 
given bid was binding and that winners were obliged to buy the chocolate. After stating 
their willingness-to-pay in the BDM procedure, they drew a ticket for the determination of 
the actual price. The respondents did not receive any compensation for their participation. 
Receiving money by the researches, so-called windfall gains, have been shown to influ-
ence the respondent's propensity to spend (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). 
The  respondents'  involvement  was  measured  by  Zaichkowsky's  Personal  Involvement 
Inventory (1994). Pre-tests showed that the item of  appealing was not applicable to the 
product  category  of  chocolate  bars,  consequently  it  was  discarded.  A factor  analysis 
revealed two factors explaining 72% of total variance. The differentiation in cognitive and 
affective  involvement  on the  basis  of  the  items'  factor  loadings  was congruent  to  the 
theory of Zaichkowsky (1994). 
Regarding the measurement method for consumer knowledge, the recommendations of 
the literature is in dispute (Brucks, 1985; Sujan, 1985). Objective knowledge, subjective 
knowledge or product familiarity were identified as important dimensions (Cordell, 1997). 
Objective knowledge reflects the acquired knowledge stored in longterm memory (Park, 
Mothersbaugh, & Feick, 1994), whereas subjective knowledge refers to the amount of 
knowledge a person presumes to hold (Brucks, 1985). Objective knowledge is assessed by 
asking  product  specific  questions,  which  should  well  reflect  the  level  of  knowledge. 
Finally,  familiarity with a product category is  also used to measure knowledge.  When 
have you last purchased a pair of jeans? – would for instance be a question concerning 
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familiarity.  Some researchers use all  three measurements for a balanced value  (Rao & 
Monroe, 1988). Cordell (1997) concludes that none of the discussed measurement options 
of expertise can significantly predict more efficiently than the others. 
Instead of asking product specific questions, the constructs brand knowledge and famil-
iarity were seen more adequate and practical for the measurement of product knowledge. 
“Brand knowledge relates to the knowledge one possesses regarding the brands that exist 
in  a  product  category,  how brands  compare  on  different  attributes,  and  which  brands 
possess which attributes” (Baker, Hunt, & Scribner, 2002, p. 47). The advantage of brand 
knowledge is that  it  can be much easier  adapted than product specific questions. This 
better meets the requirement for a flexible forecasting method than concrete questions 
about the respondent's product knowledge. Brand knowledge was assessed by asking – 
How well  do you know the following brands? – and the rating of seven brands from 
different chocolate manufacturers on a five point scale between “unknown” to “very well-
known”. 
Besides expertise, familiarity has been identified as an important component of product 
knowledge  (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987). Familiarity with chocolate bars was inferred by 
the amount of chocolate bars bought in the last seven days. In contrast to brand knowledge 
the question on familiarity covers the experience with the whole product class. Respon-
dents who purchased more than 3 chocolate bars were classified as highly familiar and 
respondents with  a lower consumption were coded as low familiar consumers. Finally, 
preference uncertainty was measured by a five-point semantic differential with “do not 
like it at all” and “do like it very much” as anchors for eight different chocolate flavors, 
e.g., milk chocolate, milk chocolate with hazelnut, white chocolate, chocolate with yogurt. 
The strengths of the respondent's liking and disliking relative to the indifference option 
was used to derive his/her preference uncertainty values. The questionnaire was developed 
by Prof. Dr. Christina Sichtmann. 
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In  order  to  test  for  moderation  effects,  the  raised  data  were  included in  a  moderated 
multiple regression analysis which is schematically illustrated in Figure 2. The moderated 
regression analysis is seen as the preferred statistical procedure for detecting interaction 
effects  (Aguinis, 1995; Russell & Bobko, 1992). As previously discussed, the measure-
ment method of the BDM was seen as approaching the true willingness-to-pay the closest 
and was used as the criterion. Except for familiarity, which was coded high and low state, 
the measured continuous data is used for the regression model. 
In a first step, the contingent valuation measurements X were introduced as predictors in 
the regression model and the BDM measurement as criterion  Z.  Following Baron and 
Kenny  (1986),  the consumer characteristics  involvement  U,  product  knowledge  V and 
preference uncertainty W were also included as predictors in the equation. The concept of 
involvement  was  differentiated  in  cognitive  U1 and  affective  U2 involvement  (cf. 
Zaichkowsky, 1994). Furthermore, product knowledge was assessed by brand knowledge 
V1 and familiarity V2. 
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Figure 2: Model of Hypothesized Relationships
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(1) Z = b0  b1 X  b2U 1 b3 U 2 b4 V 1 b5V 2 b6 W
The products between the direct price elicitation and each consumer characteristic were 
then included in the regression model in a second step. In order to prevent distortions due 
to multicollinearity the variables were mean-centered for the multiplication (cf. Aguinis, 
1995). The two steps are required in order to eliminate the direct effects of the consumer 
characteristics, as the product terms carry information both of the main effect  and the 
moderation (Bedeian & Mossholder, 1994).
(2)
Z = b0  b1 X  b2U 1 b3 U 2 b4 V 1 b5V 2 b6 W  b7 X U 1 
b8 X U 2 b9 X V 1 b10 X V 2 b11 X W
The consumer characteristics moderate the direct price elicitation, if a product term's t-
statistic between the R2s of the first and the second model is significant (Aguinis, 1995). 
Note that the overall R2 is not decisive for a theory-based identification of moderating 
effects (cf. Bedeian & Mossholder, 1994). 
5.2 Results – Descriptive Statistics, Validity
In total, more respondents in both samples preferred the Hachez milk chocolate (Table 1). 
In the UNI sample the students showed a more balanced distribution for the two chocolate 
brands. The average willingness-to-pay judgments for the chocolate bars lied between € 
0.74 and € 1.41. The given values ranged from € 0 to € 5 in the AIR and from € 0 to € 4 in 
the UNI sample. The mean comparison reveals no significant difference in willingness-to-
pay between the two samples (Table 2). The differences of the samples' average measured 
willingness-to-pay range from 1 Cent to 12 Cent. Concerning the consumer characteristics 
the preference uncertainty is the only significant difference among the two samples (Pref-
erence Uncertainty: MAIR = 1.31, MUNI = 1.22; t(452) = 3.09, p < 0.05). The AIR sample is 
in general more uncertain in its preferences. 
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In the study of Wertenbroch and Skiera  (2002) face validity was assessed among other 
tests by Fisher Z scores of the correlations between the willingness-to-pay measurements 
and the amount respondents indicated to normally pay for a can of Coke and a piece of 
cake.  They  found  that  this  amount  more  strongly  correlated  with  willingness-to-pay 
measured  by contingent  valuation  than  with the  BDM mechanism (Coke:  ZBDM =  .26 
versus Zmatch = .32; z = –.37, p < 1; cake: ZBDM = .03 versus Zmatch = .49; z = –3.06, p < .01). 
According to the Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002, p. 233) this finding showed that respon-
dents in the contingent valuation “anchor their responses on a reference price instead of 
carefully determining their situation- and context-specific true WTP.” The present study's 
data differ from this finding. The price respondents normally pay for a similar chocolate 
bar was in fact more strongly correlated with the BDM measurement (BDM: ZAIR = .29, p 
< 0.01; CV: ZAIR = .27, p < 0.01 and BDM: ZUNI = .24, p < 0.01 CV: ZUNI = .11, p > 0.5). A 
reason for this different finding may be that in the Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) study a 
slightly different approach of the open-ended contingent valuation was used, denoted as 
price matching.  The exact elicitation method used in the above mentioned study,  e.g., 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Table 2: Comparison of Samples
CV AIR-UNI in € AIR-UNI in % t Sig. (2-tailed)
Feodora -€ 0.03 -2.7% -0.26 156 .799
€ 0.01 0.5% 0.09 294 .928
BDM
Feodora -€ 0.11 -12.9% -1.25 156 .214
-€ 0.12 -11.5% -1.76 294 .080
df
Hachez
Hachez
___ _____
AIR n CV BDM
Feodora 81 € 1.16 € 0.74 € 1.00 € 0.89 € 0.82 € 0.59
187 € 1.41 € 0.89 € 1.40 € 1.00 € 0.69 € 0.57
UNI
Feodora 77 € 1.19 € 0.85 € 1.00 € 0.90 € 0.76 € 0.52
109 € 1.41 € 1.00 € 1.30 € 1.00 € 0.60 € 0.49
Mdn CV Mdn BDM SD CV SD BDM
Hachez
Hachez
5.2 Results – Descriptive Statistics, Validity
question formulation, could not be determined. Nevertheless, the assumption that people 
use the normally paid price more prevalently as a reference price in the contingent valua-
tion than in the BDM is not supported by the present results.
Regarding validity of the incentive compatible BDM mechanism, only 15.8% and 28% of 
the respondents indicated that they would revise their bid in a renewed BDM lottery in the 
AIR and UNI sample respectively. These percentages are substantially lower than those 
presented by Kaas and Ruprecht  (2006),  where 47% and 41% of auction losers were 
willing to  revise  their  bids.  Additionally,  all  respondents  in  the AIR and UNI sample 
obliged to buy in the BDM lottery actually bought the chocolate bar, which is a sign for 
high criterion validity (Völckner, 2006b). In the study of Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002), 
which  featured  a  lower  sample  size,  2.5% and 7.5% respondents  of  the  two samples 
refused to follow the purchase obligation. 
For an examination of internal validity, the individual willingness-to-pay values of the two 
samples were aggregated in the form of price response functions (see appendix,  Figure
3-6), i.e. how many respondents bought the product as a function of price. It is examined 
how many people expressed a willingness-to-pay at least as high as the relevant price 
level (Skiera & Revenstorff, 1999). Then, the data's fit to linear, y = a + bx, and multiap-
plicative, y = a . bx, models was calculated (Simon & Fassnacht, 2008; Skiera & Reven-
storff,  1999). The fit of the data reveals an overall good internal validity of either the 
linear  or  multiapplicative  function  (R2  > .90).  The  exact  results  can  be  found  in  the 
appendix (Table 7 & Table 8). 
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Table 3: Comparison of Methods
   __  ____    __  ____
CV-BDM in € CV-BDM in % t Sig. (2-tailed)
AIR Feodora € 0.42 56.7% 5.1 80 .000
€ 0.53 61.8% 8.85 186 .000
UNI Feodora € 0.34 38.7% 3.96 76 .000
€ 0.40 40.3% 6.86 108 .000
df
Hachez
Hachez
5.2 Results – Descriptive Statistics, Validity
A comparison of both measurement methods (Table 3) shows that the willingness-to-pay 
levels elicited by the contingent valuation method on average exceed those of the BDM in 
all four cases, both chocolate bars in both samples. This finding is probably best visual-
ized by the price response functions in the appendix (Figure 3-6), where the contingent 
valuation  curve  nearly  always  lies  above  the  BDM  curve.  Each  chocolate  bar  is  on 
average valued significantly higher in the hypothetical contingent valuation. The size of 
the difference ranges from 34 Cent to 53 Cent, which represents an overestimation of 
38.7% and 61.8% respectively. In line with the reviewed literature, these results not only 
support the existence of hypothetical bias, but once more illustrate the decisive effect of 
different willingness-to-pay measurement methods and the associated risk of the method 
choice for practitioners. In the study of Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) the overestimation 
of contingent valuation relative to BDM was of slightly lower, 27.4% for Coke and 50% 
for cake. 
In conclusion, 76.5% of the respondents in the AIR sample and 81.2% of the respondents 
in the UNI sample stated a different willingness-to-pay in the hypothetical (CV) and real 
situation (BDM) for the same chocolate bar. Interestingly, a substantial number of respon-
dents also understated their willingness-to-pay in the contingent valuation. 14.2% of the 
entire AIR sample and 15.6% of the UNI sample gave lower willingness-to-pay responses 
in the hypothetical than in the real setting. It is difficult to differentiate whether these 
understatements are a sign of strategic behavior or a general shortcoming of the contin-
gent valuation method linked to the hypothetical elicitation.
Furthermore, a certain importance of major price points, e.g., € 1 or € 1.5, is illustrated by 
the price response functions in the appendix (Figure 3-6). Apparently, respondents orient 
themselves at major price points when setting their personal willingness-to-pay (Gregory 
et al., 1993). Similar results are presented by Wertenbroch and Skiera  (2002). However, 
the difference in the shape of the distribution between the two measures does not seem as 
extreme as  in  Wertenbroch and Skiera's  study  (2002).  The  importance  of  major  price 
points is also apparent in the BDM data. Only the price response function for the Feodora 
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Dark Chocolate  of the UNI sample exhibits  a  noticeable  stair-like distribution for the 
direct price elicitation (Figure 6). It is striking that the importance of major price points 
appears just for this brand. The number of respondents buying this chocolate bar in both 
samples is nearly the same (81 respondents in AIR versus 77 respondents in UNI). 
5.3 Results – Regression
The initial  run of the regression models revealed multicollinearity in the data.  In both 
samples the variance inflation factors were greater than 10 for the moderator product term 
of familiarity and the contingent valuation measurement. The correlation coefficient of the 
two variables was also particularly high (r > .9,  p < .01 for both samples). The average 
VIF denoted 3.39 in the AIR sample and 4.52 in the UNI sample and the model was thus 
most  likely biased  (Field,  2005).  As a consequence,  it  was deemed necessary to omit 
familiarity from the regression model. The second run of the regression did not suffer 
from multicollinearity. Additionally, the Durbin-Watson value is sufficiently close to the 
value  of  2  (AIR:  1.63;  UNI:  1.89)  and  thus  the  assumption  of  independent  errors  is 
tenable. Furthermore, there are no signs of non-linearity or heteroscedasticity in the plot 
of standardized residuals against standardized predicted values and the assumption of the 
normality of residuals is seen as sufficiently met. 
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Table 4: Summaries of Regression Models
AIR
R² adjusted R² F Sig.
Step 1 .118 .101 7.01 .00
Step 2 .147 .117 4.94 .00
UNI
R² adjusted R² F Sig.
Step 1 .149 .125 6.29 .00
Step 2 .198 .157 4.84 .00
5.3 Results – Regression
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Table 5: Regression Results – AIR
B SE B t Sig.
Step1
Constant .35 .26 1.38 .17
Contingent Valuation .21 .05 .28 4.56 .00
Cognitive Involvement -.01 .04 -.02 -.24 .81
Affective Involvement .06 .04 .13 1.63 .10
Brand Knowledge .05 .05 .06 .99 .32
Preference Uncertainty -.17 .11 -.09 -1.58 .12
Step2
Constant .35 .26 1.36 .18
Contingent Valuation .24 .05 .30 4.93 .00
Cognitive Involvement -.01 .04 -.02 -.19 .85
Affective Involvement .05 .04 .11 1.34 .18
Brand knowledge .06 .05 .07 1.15 .25
Preference Uncertainty -.19 .11 -.10 -1.70 .09
-.05 .06 -.10 -.94 .35
.09 .06 .15 1.51 .13
CV X Brand Knowledge -.19 .08 -.14 -2.45 .02
CV X Pref. Uncertainty .06 .14 .03 .44 .66
β
CV X Cog. Inv.
CV X Aff. Inv.
5.3 Results – Regression
The regression models explain a relatively small share of the variability of the outcome 
that is accounted for by the predictors (Table 4). This unfortunately shows that the predic-
tors could only explain roughly 15% in the AIR sample and 20% in the UNI sample of the 
real willingness-to-pay measured by BDM. The adjusted R² values still are also slightly 
higher for the UNI sample. 
Regarding the regression coefficients (Table 5 & Table 6), support for the theoretical rela-
tionships between the examined consumer characteristics and the hypothetical  willing-
ness-to-pay elicitation can not be found. Except the contingent valuation,  no predictor 
made a significant contribution to the model in both samples.  H1, stating that involved 
consumers give a willingness-to-pay closer to the real willingness-to-pay, is not supported 
because neither cognitive nor affective involvement had a significant influence in both 
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Table 6: Regression Results – UNI
B SE B t Sig.
Step1
Constant .48 .27 1.77 .08
Contingent Valuation .26 .05 .35 4.81 .00
Cognitive Involvement -.03 .04 -.08 -.76 .45
Affective Involvement .06 .05 .13 1.22 .23
Brand knowledge .03 .06 .04 .52 .60
Preference uncertainty -.06 .13 -.03 -.46 .65
Step2
Constant .58 .27 2.15 .03
Contingent Valuation .25 .06 .33 4.45 .00
Cognitive Involvement -.03 .04 -.08 -.74 .46
Affective Involvement .06 .05 .14 1.30 .19
Brand knowledge .00 .06 .00 .04 .97
Preference uncertainty -.06 .13 -.03 -.48 .63
.00 .06 -.01 -.05 .96
-.08 .06 -.16 -1.33 .19
CV X Brand Knowledge -.13 .09 -.12 -1.47 .14
CV X Pref. Uncertainty -.11 .22 -.04 -.51 .61
β
CV X Cog. Inv.
CV X Aff. Inv.
5.3 Results – Regression
samples. H2  , stating that knowledgeable consumers provide a more realistic willingness-
to-pay in the contingent valuation, is also rejected by the data. In contrary to this hypoth-
esis, brand knowledge in the AIR sample significantly moderated the relationship between 
the contingent valuation and the BDM in the opposite direction. With increasing brand 
knowledge the contingent valuation measurement less predicted the BDM values. This 
relationship contradicts the hypothesis that knowledgeable respondents should form their 
hypothetical willingness-to-pay with more confidence due to their increased information 
processing capabilities. Strategic behavior might be an explanation for this result, namely 
that participants with high brand knowledge were less willing to state their true willing-
ness-to-pay. Finally, also H3 is not supported. Preference uncertainty did not significantly 
increase the match between respondent's hypothetically elicited willingness-to-pay and the 
real value. 
If the model had been successful, the adjusted beta values would have specified to what 
degree each moderator influenced the accuracy of the hypothetically stated willingness-to-
pay.  Consequently,  a contingent valuation measurement plus an assessment of product 
involvement,  product  knowledge  and  preference  uncertainty  would  have  allowed  to 
predict the respondent's real willingness-to-pay, (as if he had taken part in a BDM lottery). 
Although  the  R2 values  do  not  directly  provide  information  about  the  occurrence  of 
moderating effects, they still illustrate a limited success of the model's predictability. A 
temporary exclusion  of  the most  influential  cases  did not  improve  the  model  of  both 
samples. The data was also tested for non-linear relationships and a logarithmic transfor-
mation of the data was carried out, but the regression model could not be improved. In any 
case,  the  hypotheses H1,  H2,  H3 must  be  dismissed.  In  the  face  of  these  results,  the 
intended calibration of the contingent valuation measurement is not possible. Due to the 
missing moderation effects, forecasting using this approach is not viable. 
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6 Conclusions and Further Research Directions
The moderated regression results of both studies did not support the expected moderating 
role  of  the  consumer  characteristics  involvement,  product  knowledge  and  preference 
uncertainty. An accurate prediction of consumers' willingness-to-pay is not possible with 
the proposed characteristics alone. A finding contradictory to the elaborated theory was 
that in the AIR sample respondents with higher brand knowledge gave less realistic will-
ingness-to-pay values than participants with lower brand knowledge. 
The question remains why the consumer characteristics did not have the supposed rela-
tionship  on willingness-to-pay elicitation.  The validity comparisons  with  other  pricing 
studies do not indicate data-related issues to have distorted the analysis. The hypotheses 
testing was rather comprehensive with two samples of adequate sample sizes. Except for 
the  preference uncertainty,  no significant  differences  have  been found among the  two 
samples.  The  measured  willingness-to-pay  values  as  well  as  the  assessments  of  the 
consumer characteristics appear plausible.  
Strategic behavior of respondents in the contingent valuation may be an explanation. The 
fact  that  brand knowledge in  the  AIR sample  significantly moderated  the relationship 
between the contingent valuation method and the BDM lottery suggests the incidence of 
strategic behavior. Respondents, who had a better brand knowledge and probably recog-
nized the offered brand, may have provided a lower willingness-to-pay because they spec-
ulated on receiving the chocolate for this price or on price reductions of the producer. The 
results of List  (2001) showed a similar finding. Nondealers of sportscards were affected 
by the warnings of the hypothetical bias, whereas the dealers, a group with presumably 
high knowledge and high familiarity,  remained unaffected.  Blumenschein  (2008),  who 
also tested for the cheap talk calibration,  found that  the hypothetical  bias of only the 
informed and experienced participants was not reduced.
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However, the purpose of the study, namely the elicitation of willingness-to-pay, was not 
communicated to the respondents. On the contrary, even the attempt was made to disguise 
the  focus  on  pricing  by asking  additional  questions  regarding  the  chocolate  purchase 
behavior. Furthermore the detailed questioning on involvement, brand knowledge, famil-
iarity and preferences for chocolate flavors do certainly not represent suspicious elements 
for the focus of willingness-to-pay. More importantly, brand knowledge had a significant 
but weak influence in only the AIR sample, whereas the UNI sample does not feature any 
significant moderation effects. In addition, it is astonishing that only the brand knowledge 
and not involvement had an influence on the hypothetical willingness-to-pay elicitation. 
These considerations argue against strategic bias being the exclusive explanation for the 
missing verification. In any case, further research is needed to clarify if a relationship 
between product knowledge and an increased strategic behavior exists, also with regard to 
the studies of Blumenschein (2008) and List (2001). The exact nature and implications of 
strategic behavior are generally seen as an important research field for the development of 
hypothetical willingness-to-pay measurement methods. 
A second possible explanation is based on the fact that the contingent valuation values 
showed to  be relatively unrelated to  the real  willingness-to-pay values elicited by the 
BDM. The correlation coefficient denoted r = .3,  p < 0.01 and r = .37,  p < 0.01 for the 
UNI and the AIR sample respectively. For two methods supposed to measure the same 
concept these coefficients are surprisingly low. This suggests that people did not exces-
sively use the contingent valuation as a starting point for the inference of real willingness-
to-pay. It shows that the willingness-to-pay for the BDM lottery and the contingent valua-
tion were answered more or less independently. Furthermore, the fact that not only over-
statements  but  also  understatements  occurred  in  the  contingent  valuation  needs  to  be 
explained. 
On the basis of these results, it  is plausible that differences in the cognitive processes 
between answering hypothetical and real willingness-to-pay inquiries exist.  Consumers 
may consider different cues or follow different strategies in the determination of willing-
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ness-to-pay between hypothetical (e.g., CV) and real purchase situations (e.g., BDM). The 
relevant literature indicates that cost-based considerations may represent such a different 
strategy. 
The estimation of a product's costs has been found to be an important factor for the deriva-
tion of many consumers' hypothetically stated willingness-to-pay. For instance, Ryan and 
San Miguel  (2000) investigated inconsistent preferences for two medical tests by asking 
directly  for  both  preference  and  willingness-to-pay.  Despite  efforts  of  explaining  the 
difference between cost and value, 30% of the respondents were willing to pay more for 
their less preferred option. 60% of these inconsistent responses were referring to the costs 
of the commodity. In other words, nearly a third of the respondents preferred the cheaper 
test,  but  were stating a  higher  willingness-to-pay for  the more expensive test.  Similar 
results have also been provided by Donaldson, Shackley, and Abdalla  (1997) for open-
ended contingent valuation. In this study at least 27% of the respondents mentioned cost 
as  an  explanation  for  their  answer.  By  using  verbal  protocols,  Schkade  and  Payne 
(1994) analyzed how people respond to willingness-to-pay and found evidence for the 
existence of explicit cost considerations in contingent valuation questions e.g., estimating 
their share to cover the total costs of saving wildlife. In this regard, the costs of a good 
seem  to  represent  a  dominant  heuristic  for  deriving  hypothetical  willingness-to-pay 
values, as they provide basic information about value (Baron & Maxwell, 1996). “In sum, 
sensitivity to cost is present even when cost information is not itself provided in monetary 
form and  when  the  manipulation  of  cost  is  not  apparent  to  the  subjects”  (Baron  & 
Maxwell, 1996, p. 181). The cost-based considerations are related to the concept of a fair  
price for public and private goods (Ryan & San Miguel, 2000). People do not want to be 
exploited by the producer and are not willing to exceed the cost of a product (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Winer, 1986). 
Unfortunately,  no  literature  has  been  found  concerning  the  respondents'  process  of 
forming willingness-to-pay in a real buying situation. It may, however, be hypothesized 
that in this case cost-based responses are less prevailing. People may perceive the personal 
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value much more important if they know they will actually acquire the good and are able 
to consume it. Additionally, the situational demand is likely to play a more important role 
than in the hypothetical context. According to economic theory, a rational decision-maker 
would  trade  off  between  the  benefits  and  costs  the  good  provides  (Kirchler,  2003). 
Schkade and Pain (1994) noted that only very few actual trade-off statements were made 
in the hypothetical context. Similarly, Ajzen and Driver (1992) examined willingness-to-
pay values for leisure activities and concluded that hypothetically stated willingness-to-
pay judgments were probably not influenced by an activity's costs or benefits nor its antic-
ipated or past utility. Rather the respondents relied on cognitive heuristics like the affect 
associated with the activities and on moral considerations. Moreover, Ajzen, Brown and 
Carvajal  (2004) state that hypothetical and real contexts were construed very differently 
by the respondents. Only the real could activate strong normative beliefs, which affected 
the decision to contribute to a scholarship fund. Furthermore, 20% of the respondents in 
the study of Schkade and Payne  (1994) confessed that they just made up a number or 
guessed at an answer. This behavior is probably less likely to appear in a BDM lottery due 
to the consequences of a decision. 
In essence, whereas in the hypothetical question the focus is probably on finding a fair 
price or just a plausible price, the real situation may more strongly motivate people to 
consider  their  demand  for  the  product.  The  calibration  results  of  the  literature  where 
uncertainty statements  were  successfully  used  do  not  contradict  this  explanation.  The 
objective  of  this  study was  to  calibrate  willingness-to-pay  values,  whereas  preceding 
attempts focused on the number of people willing to buy. In this study willingness-to-pay 
was elicited by an open-ended question, which asked people to derive a value rather than a 
purchase decision.
In  accordance  with  Völckner  (2006a),  further  research  should  analyze  the  formation 
process of willingness-to-pay in general and in real purchase situations in particular, since 
this area is still relatively unexplored. Concerning willingness-to-pay measurement, it has 
been suggested that cost-based considerations, the occurrence of trade-offs as well as the 
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definition of the product may represent possible differences in the formation of real and 
hypothetical buying contexts. Furthermore, the contingent valuation literature often deals 
with public goods (e.g., Mitchell & Carson, 1990). For practical applications in the field 
of marketing it is, however, of primary interest to extend the already gained knowledge on 
private goods. Studies concerning the differences and similarities between these two cate-
gories would certainly be beneficial for the purpose of calibrating the contingent valuation 
measurements. 
In  conclusion,  additional  efforts  are  required  for  the  realization  of  hypothetical  fore-
casting.  The  relationship  between  the  hypothetical  measurement  and  the  consumers' 
involvement,  knowledge and preference uncertainty could not be validated.  Using this 
approach,  a  calibration  of  hypothetical  willingness-to-pay  in  order  to  forecast  buyer 
behavior is not possible. Still, this study offers valuable managerial and research contribu-
tions.  For  practitioners,  it  has  been  shown that  the  usage  of  the  contingent  valuation 
currently represents an untrustworthy and risky measurement of willingness-to-pay.  Its 
information does not exhibit enough validity for the derivation of pricing strategies and it 
is strongly advised to choose the more complex but more valid procedure of the BDM 
lottery.  The research contribution of  this  study was the establishment  of a  connection 
between consumer characteristics and the willingness-to-pay elicitation. In addition, the 
consideration of practical concerns is seen as important contribution to the research on 
willingness-to-pay measurements.  Although the set  up hypotheses  were not  enough to 
explain  the  inaccuracy  in  respondents'  hypothetical  willingness-to-pay,  they  certainly 
provided a new perspective on hypothetical bias. Refinements and additions are necessary 
in order to achieve valid hypothetical forecasts of willingness-to-pay. 
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Figure 3: Price Response Function – Hachez, AIR
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Figure 4: Price Response Function – Feodora, AIR
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Figure 5: Price Response Function – Hachez, UNI
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Figure 6: Price Response Function – Feodora, UNI
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Table 7: Characteristics of Price Response Functions – AIR
CV – Feodora BDM – Feodora
a 58.15 59.82 180.22 160.62
b -15.26 -25.39 -55.78 -68.75
.75 .82 .87 .88
a 96.47 110.35 402.44 417.91
b 0.33 0.16 0.25 0.12
.93 .92 .96 .95
CV – Hachez BDM – Hachez
Linear: y = a + bx
R2
Multiplicative: y = a . bx
R2
Table 8: Characteristics of Price Response Functions – UNI
CV – Feodora BDM – Feodora
a 65.36 76.45 120.35 118.28
b -20.52 -41.55 -44.94 -61.09
.80 .97 .92 .95
a 126.88 135.53 203.33 187.47
b 0.26 0.16 0.29 0.21
.93 .91 .92 .90
CV – Hachez BDM – Hachez
Linear: y = a + bx
R2
Multiplicative: y = a . bx
R2
8.3 Abstract
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Willingness-to-pay is defined as the amount somebody is willing to maximally spend on a 
certain  good.  The  knowledge  of  consumers'  willingness-to-pay  is  a  prerequisite  for 
companies to optimally price their products. In this regard, research revealed that even 
small  price improvements  have a significant impact on the profit.  In order to quickly 
recognize price potentials and effectively exploit profit opportunities, it is invaluable to 
know how much people are going to pay for a product. This study deals with the practical 
implications of forecasting willingness-to-pay for companies as such forecasts  allow a 
better planning of a product's pricing strategy.
Ideally, forecasts are accurate and flexible at the same time – requirements, which are 
difficult to meet for willingness-to-pay. A particular difficulty in the assessment of will-
ingness-to-pay is related to the fact that people generally give a higher willingness-to-pay 
if they are simply asked about it rather than if the product is really sold to them. In the 
literature this overestimation phenomenon is known as hypothetical bias. This study tries 
to correct this error, which would enable practitioners to predict willingness-to-pay infor-
mation faster and cheaper. In this regard, it  has been shown that people with a higher 
certainty in their hypothetical willingness-to-pay judgment provided a more realistic will-
ingness-to-pay than uncertain respondents. Hence, uncertainty appears to be an important 
factor in the predictability of real willingness-to-pay on the basis of stated values.
This study differentiates uncertainty in product performance uncertainty and preference 
uncertainty. Product performance uncertainty relates to the ability of a consumer to eval-
uate a product. The product evaluation is important for the determination of a willingness-
to-pay, since willingness-to-pay is linked to one's personal value. The uncertainty related 
to the performance of a product is understood as a problem of missing information. More 
specifically,  involvement and product knowledge are identified as important factors of 
efficiency and effectiveness in a consumer's decision making process. Involvement acts as 
a motivational element for the information processing whereas product knowledge is seen 
as the ability to process information. These two consumer characteristics are identified as 
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decisive sources of consumers' uncertainty in willingness-to-pay judgments due to their 
influence  on  the  amount  of  utilized  information.  Both  involved  and  knowledgeable 
consumers are supposed to state more realistic willingness-to-pay values in the hypothet-
ical situation.
In addition, preference uncertainty implies that a consumer does not hold well-defined 
preference structures for a specific product category.  For instance, he or she might be 
unsure whether to choose vanilla, chocolate or raspberry ice cream. This uncertainty in 
preferences makes the determination of willingness-to-pay more difficult and also leads to 
unstable answers. People who are certain about their  preference are likely to be more 
certain about the amount willing to pay and thus respond more realistically in direct ques-
tions.
These hypotheses were tested by two within-group studies. Respondents were first asked 
for their willingness-to-pay towards a specific chocolate bar (hypothetical situation) and 
actually purchased this chocolate bar at their willingness-to-pay by participating a Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak lottery (real  situation).  This lottery is  so designed that  participants 
have an incentive in revealing their true willingness-to-pay and is broadly accepted as 
particularly valid measurement method for willingness-to-pay. Additionally, each respon-
dent's level of involvement, product knowledge and preference uncertainty was assessed. 
In conclusion, a moderated regression could not find support for the elaborated theory. 
The proposed consumer characteristics did not significantly moderate the predictability of 
the hypothetically stated willingness-to-pay. Still, the overestimation of the hypothetical 
bias could be empirically proved. A possible explanation for the failure of the regression 
results is that consumers have different cognitive processes in the derivation of willing-
ness-to-pay judgments between real and hypothetical contexts. These differences would 
make  a  comparison  of  “hypothetical”  and  “real”  willingness-to-pay  more  difficult. 
Furthermore, a relationship indicating strategic behavior of knowledgeable respondents 
was found.
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Zahlungsbereitschaft ist definiert als jener Wert,  den jemand bereit ist maximal für ein 
Produkt zu zahlen. Das Wissen von Zahlungsbereitschaften der Konsumenten ist für die 
Festsetzung von optimalen Preisen notwendig. Die wissenschaftliche Forschung zeigte, 
dass  sich  schon die  kleinsten  Veränderungen  des  Preises  substantiell  auf  den  Gewinn 
auswirken. Um rechtzeitig Preispotenziale zu erkennen und Preise effektiv zu gestalten, ist 
es von großer Bedeutung zu wissen, welchen Preis Konsumenten am Markt bereit sein 
werden zu zahlen. Diese Studie beschäftigt sich in erster Linie mit den praktischen Anfor-
derungen  Zahlungsbereitschaft  vorherzusagen,  um Unternehmen  eine  bessere  Planung 
ihrer Preisstrategie zu ermöglichen. 
Im Idealfall sind solche Vorhersagen sowohl genau als auch flexibel – Anforderungen, die 
für Zahlungsbereitschaft  nicht leicht zu erfüllen sind.  Eine besondere Schwierigkeit  in 
diesem  Zusammenhang  ist  die  Tatsache,  dass  Befragte  üblicherweise  eine  höhere 
Zahlungsbereitschaft nennen, wenn sie nur danach gefragt werden, als wenn sie tatsäch-
lich für  diese  Zahlungsbereitschaft  aufkommen müssen.  In  der  Literatur  wird dies  als 
hypothetical bias, als eine hypothetische Verzerrung, bezeichnet. Diese Studie versucht 
diesen Meßfehler zu korrigieren,  was ein schnelleres and kostengünstigeres Mittel  zur 
Vorhersage  von  Zahlungsbereitschaft  ermöglichen  würde.  In  diesem  Zusammenhang 
wurde festgestellt, dass eine überzeugte, sichere Abgabe einer Zahlungsbereitschaft eine 
bessere Vorhersage darstellte als eine unsichere Entscheidung. Daher wird der Unsicher-
heit eine zentrale Rolle in der Vorhersagbarkeit von realen Zahlungsbereitschaften auf der 
Basis von hypothetisch erfragten Zahlungsbereitschaften zugeschrieben. 
Dabei wird die Unsicherheit in Unsicherheit gegenüber der Produktleistung und Unsicher-
heit gegenüber den eigenen Präferenzen unterschieden. Die Unsicherheit gegenüber der 
Produktleistung bezieht sich auf die Fähigkeiten ein Produkt zu beurteilen, was ein wich-
tiger Aspekt der Zahlungsbereitschaft darstellt, da diese den persönlichen Wert ausdrückt. 
Diese Unsicherheit wird als Problem fehlender Information verstanden. Das Involvement 
und das Produktwissen werden dabei als wichtige Einflussfaktoren für die Informations-
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verarbeitung im Entscheidungsprozess gesehen. Während Involvement motivierend wirkt 
sich mit Informationen auseinanderzusetzen, stellt Produktwissen die Fähigkeit zur Verar-
beitung von Informationen dar. Diese beiden Eigenschaften werden als wichtige Ursachen 
für Unsicherheit verstanden und es wird vermutet, dass sie die Vorhersagbarkeit von hypo-
thetischen Zahlungsbereitschaften moderieren, indem sie sachkundige und daher sichere 
Entscheidungen bewirken.
Zusätzlich, bedeutet Unsicherheit der Präferenz, dass jemand nicht über ein gut ausge-
prägtes Präferenzmuster verfügt. Zum Beispiel kann ein Entscheidungsträger unschlüssig 
sein, ob er oder sie lieber Vanille-, Schokolade- oder Erdbeereis kaufen soll. Diese Unsi-
cherheit macht es schwierig eine Zahlungsbereitschaft abzuleiten, welche dann auch selten 
konstant bleibt. 
Die aufgestellte Theorie wurde mittels zweier Studien überprüft. Die Versuchspersonen 
wurden zuerst über ihre Zahlungsbereitschaft für eine bestimmte Tafel Schokolade befragt 
(hypothetische Situation) und später wurde ihnen diese Tafel zu ihrer Zahlungsbereitschaft 
mit der sogenannten Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Lotterie verkauft (reale Situation). Diese 
Lotterie bietet den Teilnehmern einen Anreiz ihre wahre Zahlungsbereitschaft zu nennen 
und ist als eine der validesten Messmethoden anerkannt. Zusätzlich wurde das Involve-
ment, das Produktwissen und die Unsicherheit der Präferenzen für Schokolade abgefragt. 
Abschließend konnte eine moderierte Regressionsanalyse die Hypothesen zu den Modera-
toreneffekten der drei Eigenschaften nicht bestätigen. Die Vorhersagbarkeit wurde nicht 
im erwartendem Sinne beeinflusst. Jedoch wurde die Existenz der Verzerrung von hypo-
thetisch  abgegebenen  Zahlungsbereitschaften  deutlich  bewiesen.  Für  das  Fehlen  von 
signifikanten  Ergebnissen  könnten  Unterschiede  in  den  Entscheidungsprozessen  der 
Zahlungsbereitschaft in der hypothetischen und der realen Situation verantwortlich sein. 
Diese Unterschiede würden eine Verbesserung der Messergebnisse erschweren. Zusätzlich 
wurde  ein  Zusammenhang  festgestellt,  der  auf  strategisches  Verhalten  von  Experten 
schließen lässt. 
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